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I. INTRODUCTION
The seat belt defense in an automobile personal injury case
reduces the damages for which the defendant is responsible, be-
cause the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt caused a portion
of plaintiff's damages.' Consideration of the seat belt defense
raises two basic questions-whether jurisdictions should allow
the defense 2 and, if so, what impact the defense should have on
the plaintiff's recovery.3 Recently enacted mandatory seat belt
use statutes4 and the installation of air bags in many 1990
model automobiles 5 will create additional seat belt defense is-
sues in the near future.
During the last twenty years, several courts have adopted
the seat belt defense 6 and several have rejected it. 7 Since 1986
1. See infra notes 6, 7. Many law review articles have dealt with the seat
belt defense. See, e.g., Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense-State of the Law, 53
MARQ. L. REV. 172 (1970); Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Soph-
istry, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 613 (1967); Westenberg, Buckle Up or Pay: The Emerg-
ing Safety Belt Defense, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 867 (1986); Note, A Compromise
Between Mitigation and Comparative Fault?: A Critical Assessment of the
Seat Belt Controversy and a Proposal for Reform, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 319
(1986) [hereinafter A Compromise]; Note, Reallocating the Risk of Loss in Au-
tomobile Accidents by Means of Mandatory Seat Belt Use Legislation, 52 S.
CAL. L. REV. 91 (1978) [hereinafter Reallocating the Risk]; Note, Self-Protec-
tive Safety Devices: An Economic Analysis, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 (1973)
[hereinafter Self-Protective Safety Devices]; Note, The Failure to Use Seat Belts
as a Basis for Establishing Contributory Negligence, Barring Recovery for Per-
sonal Injuries, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 277 (1967); Note, Seat Belt Negligence In Auto-
mobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 288 (1967).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 42-162.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 163-299.
4. See infra note 31. The statutes are discussed infra text accompanying
notes 121-52, 221-45.
5. See infra text accompanying note 52.
6. See Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F. Supp. 1561, 1563-64
1989] 1371
1372 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1369
(D. Vt. 1985); Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Alaska 1986); Law v.
Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147, 157, 755 P.2d 1135, 1145 (1988); Harlan v. Curbo,
250 Ark. 610, 612, 466 S.W.2d 459, 460-61 (1971) (by implication); Franklin v.
Gibson, 138 Cal. App. 3d 340, 342-43, 188 Cal. Rptr. 23, 24-25 (1982); Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. 1984); Cannon v. Lardner,
185 Ga. App. 194, , 363 S.E.2d 574, 576 (1987), vacated in pt, aff'd in pt., 258
Ga. 332, -, 368 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1988); Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 179
(Ky. 1987); Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 449, 410 N.W.2d 706, 721
(1987); Dunn v. Durso, 219 N.J. Super. 383, 386-87, 530 A.2d 387, 389 (1986);
Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 449, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920
(1974); Dahl v. BMW, 304 Or. 558, 564, 748 P.2d 77, 81 (1987) (en banc); Foley v.
City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 478, 335 N.W.2d 824, 827 (1983) (how to al-
locate damages); see also Annotation, Nonuse of Automobile Seatbelts as Evi-
dence of Comparative Negligence, 95 A.L.R.3d 239, 242-47 (1979) (citing cases
accepting view that nonuse constitutes negligence); Annotation, Automobile
Occupant's Failure to Use Seat Belt as Contributory Negligence, 92 A.L.R.3d 9,
29-35 (1979) (noting cases in which defense established or not); Annotation,
Non Use of Seat Belt as Failure to Mitigate Damages, 80 A.L.R.3d 1033, 1041-47
(1977) (summarizing views accepting and rejecting consideration of seat belt
use in damages calculations).
The conceptual problem of the seat belt defense was raised earlier in Ma-
honey v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 A. 762 (1929), in which the plaintiff
drove his automobile at an excessive speed, and the defendant negligently
drove into it. Id. at 186, 147 A. at 764. The plaintiff's speed did not cause the
collision, but it did increase the damages. The court held that the plaintiff
could recover for all the damages he had suffered. Id. at 200, 147 A. at 768.
Another area in which this issue has been raised is the motorcycle helmet
defense. The development of this defense has paralleled that of the seat belt
defense. An early case rejecting the motorcycle helmet defense based its hold-
ing on an analogy to the seat belt defense. Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 242,
262 A.2d 549, 553 (1970). For a later case adopting the motorcycle helmet de-
fense, see Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1983) (accepting ar-
gument for mitigating damages based on helmet nonuse); see also Annotation,
Failure of Motorcyclist to Wear Protective Helmet or Other Safety Equipment
as Contributory Negligence, Assumption of Risk or Failure to Avoid Conse-
quences of Accident, 40 A.L.R.3d 856, 856-57 (1971) (citing Rogers v. Frush as
sole case on the issue).
7. See Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 504, 242 So. 2d 666, 671 (1970);
Churning v. Staples, 628 P.2d 180, 181 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Lipscomb v.
Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d
720, 722 (D.C. 1976); Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 780, 727 P.2d 1187, 1208-09
(1986); Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill. 2d 129, 131, 483 N.E.2d 268, 268 (1985); State
v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ind. 1981); Raterree v. Bartlett, 238 Kan. 11, 18,
707 P.2d 1063, 1069 (1985); Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471,
492-94, 610 P.2d 668, 679 (1980); Welsh v. Anderson, 228 Neb. 79, 83, 421 N.W.2d
426, 428-29 (1988); Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 645-46, 708 P.2d 297, 303
(1985) (stating defense inapplicable in strict liability case); Miller v. Miller, 273
N.C. 228, 232-37 160 S.E.2d 65, 68-71 (1968); Bendner v. Carr, 40 Ohio App. 3d
149, 153, 532 N.E.2d 178, 182 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Fields v. Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla. 1976); Grim v. Betz, 539 A.2d 1365, 1367 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988); Keaton v. Pearson, 292 S.C. 579, 580, 358 S.E.2d 141, 141
(1987); Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116, 116-17 (Tex. 1974); Amend v.
Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 132-34, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977) (holding seat belt defense
invalid because seat belts not required in cars).
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alone, six courts have adopted it and five have rejected it.8
Courts that have rejected the seat belt defense have done so for
a variety of theories, reasoning that there is no duty to wear a
seat belt,9 that the plaintiff need not anticipate the defendant's
negligence, 10 that the majority of the community does not wear
seat belts,"1 that the seat belt defense differs from traditional
defenses,' 2 and that the seat belt defense creates substantial ad-
ministrative problems.13 Courts that have adopted the seat belt
defense have done so because the failure to wear a seat belt
may be negligent and plaintiffs should bear responsibility for
damages caused by their negligence.
When the seat belt defense is at issue, the damages suf-
fered by plaintiffs fall into two categories. This Article will re-
fer to one category of damages, the damages plaintiffs would
have suffered even if they had worn seat belts, as primary dam-
ages. This Article will refer to the other category of damages,
the damages plaintiffs would have avoided had they worn seat
belts, as exacerbation damages.14
Jurisdictions that reject the seat belt defense make defend-
ants responsible for all the damages that plaintiffs suffer.' 5
Some jurisdictions that adopt the seat belt defense permit
plaintiffs to recover only those damages that they would have
suffered had they worn seat belts; in other words, plaintiffs are
8. See supra notes 6, 7.
9. See infra note 42 and text accompanying notes 42-49.
10. See infra note 56 and text accompanying notes 56-61.
11. See infra note 62 and text accompanying notes 62-66.
12. See infra note 98 and text accompanying notes 98-107.
13. See infra note 153 and text accompanying notes 153-62.
14. In Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 241, 544 A.2d 357,
358 (1988), the New Jersey Supreme Court refers to those damages the plain-
tiff could have avoided by wearing a seat belt as seat belt damages rather than
"exacerbation" damages. The term seat belt damages is confusing because
these damages were not caused by the seat belt, but by the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt.
Professor Twerski refers to those damages that the plaintiff would have
suffered even if the plaintiff had worn a seat belt as "first collision" rather
than "primary" damages and to those damages that the plaintiff could have
avoided by wearing a seat belt as "second collision" rather than "exacerbation"
damages. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking
Some Products Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 327 (1977). The term
second collision injuries is somewhat confusing because the plaintiff's failure
to wear a seat belt will not in all cases be the cause of all of the injuries result-
ing from the second collision-the collision of the plaintiff with the car. In
many cases, the plaintiff would have suffered some of these damages even if
wearing a seat belt.
15. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 7.
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not entitled to recover any exacerbation damages.16 This Arti-
cle will refer to that type of seat belt defense as the no-exacer-
bation-damage-recovery seat belt defense.
This Article argues that both the rule imposing the entire
responsibility for exacerbation loss on the defendant-the re-
jection of the seat belt defense-and the rule imposing the en-
tire responsibility for exacerbation damages on the plaintiff-
the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense-are
unfair. The rules are both unfair because of what Professor
William Prosser called in another context "the obvious injustice
of a rule which visits the entire loss caused by the fault of two
parties on one of them alone.' 17
One can illustrate the unfairness of both of these rules by
considering the quite common case in which the plaintiff would
not have suffered any injuries if the plaintiff had worn a seat
belt and, therefore, all of the personal injuries of the plaintiff
are exacerbation damages.' 8 Under these facts, in a jurisdiction
that rejects the seat belt defense, the defendant is responsible
for all of the plaintiff's damages. Such a rule is similar to a
rule that would not allow either contributory negligence or
comparative negligence as a defense-the defendant is given
full responsibility for damages that the plaintiff's failure to
take reasonable precautions caused. Under the suggested facts,
in a jurisdiction that applies the no-exacerbation-damage-recov-
ery seat belt defense, the plaintiff receives no recovery. That
defense is similar to the contributory negligence defense, which
forty-four jurisdictions have rejected' 9-the defendant is not re-
16. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984);
Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920
(1974). For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 167-
88.
17. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 469 (1953).
18. In both Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 448, 323 N.E.2d at 166, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 918,
and Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 450, for example, the plaintiff's injuries con-
sisted entirely of exacerbation damages. In those cases, the unfairness of a
rule that does not allow a plaintiff to recover any damages that a negligent de-
fendant caused is fairly obvious. In cases in which there are primary damages,
however, the unfairness of the seat belt defense rule is clouded by the fact
that courts allow the plaintiff to recover primary damages. The fact that
courts allow the plaintiff to recover damages that the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt did not cause does not justify denying recovery of other dam-
ages that both the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's failure to wear a
seat belt caused.
19. Only Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, and the District of Columbia retain contributory negligence. See
Cooter & Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1067, 1067 n.2 (1986).
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quired to pay for any of the plaintiff's damages, even though
the defendant's negligent operation of the vehicle caused those
injuries.
The seat belt defense some jurisdictions have adopted al-
lows the jury to determine what effect the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt will have on the plaintiff's recovery.20 The
jury resolves what should be an issue of law-what form of the
seat belt defense to apply. Such a rule will yield inconsistent
verdicts, many of which will not be based pn the factors that
courts should assess in setting damages.2 '
Mitigation cap statutes, adopted in three states, limit reduc-
tion of the plaintiff's recovery under the seat belt defense to a
small portion-one to five percent-of the plaintiff's dam-
ages.2 2 Such statutes create a low cap on damage reduction that
is inconsistent with principles of comparative fault.23 In addi-
tion, the mitigation cap statutes apply only to front-seat occu-
pants and may draw an unreasonable distinction between front
and back-seat occupants.2 4
Courts should adopt a seat belt defense that is consistent
with the principles of comparative fault. Under comparative
fault, courts divide responsibility for damages caused by both
the negligence of plaintiffs and the negligence of defendants
based on their respective degrees of culpability. Courts reduce
the plaintiffs' recovery by that percentage of responsibility as-
signed to them.25 If courts apply the principles of comparative
fault to the seat belt defense, defendants will be responsible for
all of plaintiffs' primary damages-those damages the plaintiffs
would have suffered had they worn seat belts-and courts will
apportion responsibility for exacerbation damages based on the
relative fault of the parties. Under this proposed system, the
trier-of-fact first should determine the plaintiff's exacerbation
damages; that is, the amount of damages the plaintiff would
have avoided had the plaintiff worn a seat belt.26 Second, the
trier-of-fact should determine what percentage of the fault that
is responsible for those exacerbation damages to allot to the
20. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 211-20.
22. See infra note 34.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 221-27.
24. See infra note 228 and text accompanying notes 228-36.
25. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Calif., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828-29, 532 P.2d 1226,
1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla.
1973); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 690, 634 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1981).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 251-66.
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plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt.2 7 The court should reduce
the plaintiff's exacerbation damage recovery by that percentage
of fault allotted to the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt.
The issues raised by the seat belt defense require jurisdic-
tions to evaluate the underlying principles of the tort system.
If a jurisdiction bases its decision on policies of compensation
and risk spreading, it will reject the seat belt defense because
defendants are more likely than plaintiffs to have insurance
that will provide full compensation for a plaintiff's loss, and in-
surance premiums'spread the risk of loss to all who purchase
liability insurance. 28 If a jurisdiction bases its decision on a
cheapest cost avoider/economic efficiency theory, it will adopt
27. See infra text accompanying notes 267-75.
28. Kleist, supra note 1, discusses a risk spreading approach to the seat
belt defense, at 616-19. Under the risk spreading theory, courts impose liabil-
ity on a defendant when the defendant has a means of spreading the cost of
the injury through society and the plaintiff has no means of spreading the loss.
See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440-
41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). The justification for the risk spreading
theory is-that it is better for all of society to bear a small cost than for a few to
bear what may be overwhelming losses. Under the risk spreading theory, the
torts system acts as an insurance plan for injuries caused by those who can
spread the loss. Everyone pays premiums into the system through higher
prices for products, services, and insurance. When people are injured, they re-
cover benefits in the form of personal injury damages.
The seat belt defense leaves some injured plaintiffs without compensation
for very severe injuries. Some of these plaintiffs may have health insurance
plans that will pay for their medical expenses or employee benefit plans that
will pay for their lost wages, but many will not have such benefits. Defend-
ants who drive negligently, however, are likely to have automobile liability in-
surance protection. If jurisdictions reject the seat belt defense, plaintiffs will
recover compensation for the losses that they have suffered from the defend-
ants' insurance companies. Liability insurance premiums will be a bit higher
for everyone, but those who are injured will be compensated.
Risk spreading through the tort system creates certain inequities, how-
ever. Those who receive benefits do not receive benefits based on what they
have paid. If a jurisdiction rejects the seat belt defense, plaintiffs can recover
for all of their injuries, including those damages that their failure to wear a
seat belt caused. The liability insurance premiums are higher for everyone
under this system than they would have been if the jurisdiction had accepted
the seat belt defense. Assume a poor laborer and a wealthy professional, each
with similar driving records. Each pays the same amount of automobile liabil-
ity insurance. Assume that each is permanently disabled in an automobile col-
lision both because of the negligence of a defendant and because of failure to
wear a seat belt. If the jurisdiction rejects the seat belt defense, each will be
able to recover for the permanent disability. The wealthy professional, how-
ever, will receive substantially greater benefits because the professional's fu-
ture earning capacity will be much greater. The laborer paid the same amount
into the system in premiums, but the laborer's benefits are substantially less.
This system spreads the risk, but spreads it unjustly. If a legislature wanted to
create a fair risk-spreading system, it could create a system in which one pays
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the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense, because
plaintiffs, by buckling their seat belts, can avoid exacerbation
damages at the cheapest cost.29 If a jurisdiction bases its deci-
into the system an amount commensurate with what one may draw from the
system.
Courts generally have not followed risk spreading as a goal of tort law
when it conflicts with other goals of the tort system. Those cases in which
courts apply comparative fault to strict products liability illustrate the failure
to follow risk spreading. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,
742, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (1978) (extending comparative
fault to actions founded on strict products liability); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 712 (5th ed.
1984). If risk spreading were the controlling justification for products liability,
defenses based on the plaintiff's conduct would not apply. The risk of injury
to the plaintiff who is at fault as well as to the plaintiff who is not at fault
could be spread throughout society. The risk that one will be injured by a de-
fective product could be spread throughout society by rejecting defenses based
on a plaintiff's conduct, and yet the strong trend is toward the application of
comparative fault to strict products liability cases. See id. Cases such as Daly
indicate that courts see the assignment of responsibility for loss based on the
relative fault of the parties, as advocated by this Article, as a more important
goal of the tort system than risk spreading.
29. A cheapest cost avoider/economic efficiency approach to the seat belt
defense is advocated in Reallocating the Risk, supra note 1, at 139-51; and Self
Protective Safety Devices, supra note 1, at 433.40. Both authors base their po-
sitions on Professor Calabresi's economic analysis. Calabresi has argued that
the proper tort rule is the efficient rule-the rule that causes the lowest sum
of accident costs and prevention costs. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and
the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 69, 84-85
(1975). The goal is not to avoid all accidents, but rather to encourage people to
participate in activity that creates risks that are justified in terms of their
costs. The resulting number of accidents will be efficient. Calabresi argues
that society should place liability on the cheapest cost avoider, that person who
can avoid the accident at the cheapest cost. Then, that person can make the
economically efficient decision whether or not to avoid the risk. If the cheap-
est cost avoider calculates that the safety precautions cost more than the risk
of harm, the cheapest cost avoider will not employ the safety measure. If the
cheapest cost avoider's calculations are correct, the efficient result is achieved.
If the cheapest cost avoider calculates that the safety precautions cost less
than the value of the risk of harm, the cheapest cost avoider will employ the
safety measure. Because the decisionmaker is the cheapest cost avoider, the
method adopted generally should be the most efficient method of avoiding the
harm.
In the context of the seat belt defense, the cheapest cost avoider will be
the party that generally could avoid the risk of exacerbation damages at the
least cost. The calculation is complicated by two factors. First, there is not an
easily calculated market value for either buckling a seat belt or driving with
greater care. Second, the safety steps available to the plaintiff and those avail-
able to the defendant do not avoid the same harm. Plaintiffs can use seat belts
and avoid the exacerbation damages. Defendants cannot avoid all exacerba-
tion damages unless they stop driving. Driving more safely will avoid causing
some exacerbation damages and will avoid other damages as well.
It is possible to identify roughly the cheapest cost avoider in the seat belt
1989] 1377
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sion on a comparative fault/corrective justice theory, it will
adopt the seat belt defense proposed in this Article, one that di-
vides responsibility for exacerbation damages based on the rela-
tive fault of the parties.30
Within the last few years, twenty-nine states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have enacted statutes requiring seat belt
use.31 Some of these statutes prohibit the introduction of the
defense cases by comparing the cost to plaintiffs of avoiding exacerbation dam-
ages with the cost to defendants of avoiding a similar amount of damages.
Plaintiffs can avoid exacerbation damages by buckling their seat belts. Ac-
cording to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration studies, 12,000 to
15,000 lives could be saved annually if all vehicle occupants used seat belts.
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTs 53 (1986). What cost would de-
fendants have to incur to achieve a similar savings? The National Safety
Council estimates that 450 to 600 lives could be saved if the speed limit on ru-
ral interstate highways were 55 mph rather than 65 or 70 mph. Id Obviously,
the cost to drivers of taking steps that would save the number of lives that
would be saved if occupants used seat belts (12,000-15,000) would be enormous.
It is thus easy to conclude that the plaintiff in the seat belt case is the cheapest
cost avoider. Under such an ecomomic efficiency theory, jurisdictions would
adopt the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense.
The economic efficiency argument for the no-exacerbation-damage-recov-
ery seat belt defense, however, assumes that vehicle occupants will learn of
the seat belt defense rule and that the rule will encourage them to use their
seat belts. It is doubtful that many people know the seat belt defense rule in
their jurisdiction. Further, if people did know the seat belt defense rule, it is
doubtful that such knowledge would affect their behavior. If the fear of injury
does not cause people to use seat belts, it is unlikely that the fear of reduction
in damage recovery for collision injuries will cause them to buckle seat belts.
30. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1095-96.
31. The states with mandatory usage laws are: California, CAL. VEH.
CODE § 27315 (West Supp. 1989); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-236 (Supp.
1987); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-100a (West 1987); District of
Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1601-1607 (1986); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 316.614 (West Supp. 1989); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 291-11.6(d) (1985);
Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 49-764 (Supp. 1988); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2,
para. 12-603.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 9-8-14-1 to
14-6 (Burns 1987); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445 (West Supp. 1988); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2501-2507 (Supp. 1987); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 32:295.1 (West Supp. 1988); Maryland, MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 22-412.3
(1987); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 257.710e (West Supp. 1988); Min-
nesota, MINN. STAT. § 169.686 (1988); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.178
(Vernon Supp. 1989); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-13-101 to 106 (1987);
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-76.2(a)-(k) (West Supp. 1988); New Mexico,
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-7-370 to 373 (Supp. 1987); New York, N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1229-c (McKinney 1986); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
135.2A (Supp. 1988); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.263 (Anderson Supp.
1988); Oklahoma, OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 12-416 to 420 (West 1988 & West
Supp. 1989); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 4581 (Purdon Supp. 1988);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-9-603 to 610 (1988) (repealed effective June
30, 1990); Texas, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 107C (Vernon Supp.
1989); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6-181 to 186 (Supp. 1987); Virginia, VA.
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statute to establish that failure to wear a seat belt is negli-
gent.32 Other statutes either prohibit the seat belt defense"3 or
limit reduction of the plaintiff's damages to a small percentage
of those damages. 34 Still other mandatory use statutes do not
mention the seat belt defense.35 It may be that courts will treat
a violation of these mandatory use statutes that do not mention
CODE ANN. § 46.1-309.2 (Supp. 1988); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 46.61.688 (1987); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48 (West Supp. 1988). For
a discussion of these statutes, see infra text accompanying notes 124-49.
32. The following jurisdictions specifically prohibit the introduction of
their mandatory use statutes to establish that the plaintiff's failure to use a
seat belt is negligent: California, CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315(j) (West Supp. 1989);
District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-1607 (1986); Florida, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 316.614(10) (West Supp. 1989); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para.
12-603.1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 9-8-14-5
(Burns. 1987); Maryland, MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 22-412.3(h) (1987); Mon-
tana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-13-106 (1987); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-
7-373B (Supp. 1987); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4513.263(G) (Anderson
Supp. 1988) (providing that seat belt usage may be admitted into evidence only
in claims involving product liability); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-
309.2E (Supp. 1988). For a discussion of these statutes, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 140-42.
33. The mandatory use statutes in the following states provide that evi-
dence of the plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt is not admissible in civil ac-
tions: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-100a(c)(4) (West 1987);
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2504(c) (Supp. 1987); North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-135.2A(d) (Supp. 1987); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12-
420 (West 1988); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-9-604 (1988) (repealed ef-
fective June 30, 1990); Texas, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 107C(j)
(Vernon Supp. 1989); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-186 (Supp. 1987); Washing-
ton, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.688(6) (1987). Maine, which does not have
a mandatory use statute, also has rejected the seat belt defense. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1368-A (1978). For a discussion of these statutes, see infra
text accompanying notes 137-39.
In the following states, it is unclear whether the statute prohibits the seat
belt defense in cases in which the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt is a
violation of the mandatory use statute, or merely prohibits the defendant from
using the statute to establish the seat belt defense: District of Columbia, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-1607 (1986); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 12-
603.1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); Maryland, MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 22-
412.3(h) (1987); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-13-106 (1987); Nevada, NEV.
REV. STAT. § 484.641(4) (Supp. 1987); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-
373B (Supp. 1987); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.26.3(G)(2) (Anderson
Supp. 1987); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 4581(e) (Purdon Supp.
1988); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-309.2E (Supp. 1988). For a discus-
sion of these statutes, see infra text accompanying notes 143-47.
34. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445 4(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988) (5%); MICH.
Coip. LAvs ANN. § 257.710e(5) (West Supp. 1988) (5%); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 307.178 sec. 3(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (1%); cf WIS. STAT. ANN. § 347.48(g)
(West Supp. 1988), discussed infra at note 250. For a discussion of the mitiga-
tion statutes, see infra text accompanying notes 221-45.
35. IDAHO CODE § 49-764 (Supp. 1987), and MINN. STAT. § 169.686 (1988).
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the seat belt defense as negligence per se.36 In addition,
mandatory use statutes may cause the majority of the commu-
nity to use seat belts. This may aid the seat belt defense indi-
rectly, because courts may admit the general community
practice of using seat belts as evidence that failure to wear a
seat belt is negligent, and juries are likely to view a deviation
from community practice as negligence.3 7
To further complicate the seat belt defense, a substantial
number of American vehicles will include air bags beginning
with the 1990 model year.38 Air bags alone, however, provide
substantially less protection than a combination of air bag and
seat belt use.39 Manufacturers, the federal government, and
the news media warn the public that people should wear seat
belts, even in vehicles equipped with air bags.40 An issue many
courts will face in the near future is whether to apply the seat
belt defense to a plaintiff who fails to wear a seat belt when sit-
ting in a seat protected by an air bag.41
Part II of this Article will consider whether courts and leg-
islatures should adopt the seat belt defense. It will consider
whether the failure to wear a seat belt constitutes negligence,
whether the failure to use a seat belt in a car equipped with an
air bag constitutes negligence, and whether the seat belt de-
fense is consistent with traditional rules of tort law. In addi-
tion, Part II will evaluate the impact of new mandatory seat
belt use statutes on the seat belt defense and consider whether
the seat belt defense is worth the administrative problems that
accompany it. Part III will consider how courts divide responsi-
bility for damages under the seat belt defense and will propose
that courts reduce plaintiffs' recovery of those damages that the
36. The Supreme Court of Idaho has expressly reserved the question of
the effect of the Idaho statute on the seat belt defense in that state. Quick v.
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 781 n.7, 727 P.2d 1187, 1209 n.7 (1986).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
38. See infra text accompanying note 73.
Air bags are fabric cushions that are very rapidly inflated with gas to
cushion the occupant and prevent him or her from colliding with the
vehicle interior when a crash occurs that is strong enough to trigger a
sensor in the vehicle. (Generally, the bag will inflate at a barrier
equivalent impact speed of about 12 miles per hour.)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC AND
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO.
208 OCCUPANT CRASH PROTECTION 9 (1984) [hereinafter NHTSA STANDARD].
39. See infra text accompanying notes 76-85.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 90-93.
41. For a discussion of the impact air bags are likely to have on the seat
belt defense, see infra text accompanying notes 73-97.
1380 [Vol. 73:1369
SEAT BELT DEFENSE
plaintiffs could have avoided by wearing a seat belt, based on
their relative fault in failing to wear a seat belt.
II. ADOPTION OF THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE
A. A DUTY TO WEAR A SEAT BELT?
Some courts reject the seat belt defense because they find
no duty to wear a seat belt.42 These courts require defendants
to show that plaintiffs have a duty to wear seat belts based on
an analogy to the common tort law requirement that the plain-
tiff show that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff.4 3 In
order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff normally
must establish that the defendant owed a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care for the safety of the plaintiff.44
When courts require that defendants show that plaintiffs
have a duty to buckle up, however, courts are using the term
duty in an unusual manner. When plaintiffs fail to buckle their
seat belts, one could say that they have violated a duty only to
themselves. 45 Speaking of a duty to oneself, however, strains
the meaning of the term. Duty is a term of relationship. A
duty is something that one person owes to another. It would
also be absurd to argue that plaintiffs owe a duty to other driv-
ers to wear seat belts so that other drivers will not be liable for
42. See Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 508, 242 So. 2d 666, 675 (1970);
Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill. 2d 129, 133, 483 N.E.2d 268, 270 (1985); State v. In-
gram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ind. 1981); Raterree v. Bartlett, 238 Kan. 11, 18, 707
P.2d 1063, 1069 (1985); Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471,
492, 500, 610 P.2d 668, 679, 683 (1980); Welsh v. Anderson 228 Neb. 79, 82-83,
421 N.W.2d 426, 428-29 (1988); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 239, 160 S.E.2d 65,
74 (1968); Keaton v. Pearson, 292 S.C. 579, 580, 358 S.E.2d 141, 141 (1987);
Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 132, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977).
43. Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d at 132, 570 P.2d at 143, states:
The premise upon which negligence rests is that an actor has a legally
imposed duty .... The question then is whether the court should im-
pose a standard of conduct upon all persons riding in vehicles
equipped with seat belts. We think we should not.
1d.
44. Controversy exists over to whom the defendant owes the duty of rea-
sonable care. The New York Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Jus-
tice Cardozo, held that the duty of reasonable care is owed to those foreseeably
injured. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100
(1928). Justice Andrews, in a widely-followed dissent, argued that the duty of
reasonable care is owed to the whole world. Id. at 350, 162 N.E. at 103.
45. The court in Dunn v. Durso, 219 N.J. Super. 383, 399, 530 A.2d 387, 395
(1986), makes this argument, stating, "The 'duty' imposed does not refer to an
obligation of conduct directed toward another person. Rather, the duty per-




as great an amount in damages if they injure the plaintiffs. 46
Although some courts have concluded that plaintiffs vio-
late a duty by failing to wear a seat belt,47 the better solution to
the duty problem is for courts to find that there need not be a
duty to buckle up as a requirement for the seat belt defense.
The duty question in seat belt cases arises because of an inap-
propriate application to the seat belt defense of principles
drawn from the question of defendants' responsibility for inju-
ries caused by their negligence. The closer analogy, however, is
between the seat belt defense and contributory or comparative
negligence. As Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts says in
the context of contributory and comparative negligence:
Negligence as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an
undue risk of harm to others. Contributory negligence is conduct
which involves an undue risk of harm to the actor himself. Negli-
gence requires a duty, an obligation of conduct to another person.
Contributory negligence involves no duty, unless we are to be so inge-
nious as to say that the plaintiff is under an obligation to protect the
defendant against liability for the consequences of the plaintiff's own
negligence.
48
As with the contributory and comparative negligence defenses,
there should be no duty requirement for the seat belt defense.
49
46. See infra text accompanying note 48.
47. Dunn v. Durso, 219 N.J. Super. 383, 400, 530 A.2d 387, 395 (1986); Bent-
zler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 385, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639 (1967); see also Franklin
v. Gibson, 138 Cal. App. 3d 340, 344, 188 Cal. Rptr. 23, 25 (1982) ("We do not
intend to establish a duty to wear seat belts .... ."); Dahl v. BMW, 304 Or. 558,
564, 748 P.2d 77, 80 (1987) (en banc) (examining "weaknesses inherent in...
'no duty' conclusions"); cf Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F. Supp.
1561, 1564 (D. Vt. 1985) (finding that "the lack of any statutorily or judicially
created duty to wear one's seat belt does not preclude a court from admitting
this as evidence on the question of negligence"); Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd.,
428 Mich. 439, 456, 410 N.W.2d 706, 713 (1987) (same).
48. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 453 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
49. Some states that in the past have rejected the seat belt defense be-
cause they found no duty to buckle a seat belt may find such a duty in one of
the recently enacted statutes requiring seat belt use. See supra notes 31-36 and
accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 129-30; see also Quick v.
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 781 n.7, 727 P.2d 1187, 1209 n.7 (1986) (expressly reserv-
ing question of whether new seat belt law creates defense). Some courts that
rejected the seat belt defense on the no duty basis stated that it was for the
legislature to establish such a duty. See State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448
(Ind. 1981); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 238, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1968); Keaton
v. Pearson, 292 S.C. 579, 580, 358 S.E.2d 141, 141 (1987).
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B. SEAT BELT USE AND THE STANDARD
OF REASONABLE CARE
1. The Reasonable Person
The question whether failure to use a seat belt is negligent
can be analyzed under traditional negligence concepts. The
standard of reasonable care requires one to act as an ordinary
reasonable person, taking into consideration the burden of any
available safety precautions, the probability of loss if one does
not take a precaution, and the loss that one might suffer if one
does not take a precaution.50 As Judge Learned Hand noted,
negligence can be expressed in mathematical terms. One is
negligent if one fails to take a precaution for which the burden
of precaution is less than the foreseeable probability that injury
will occur, times the loss that might occur if the safety precau-
tion is not taken.51
In the seat belt context, the plaintiff is negligent under the
Hand formula if the burden of buckling and wearing a seat
belt 52 is less than the probability that the plaintiff will suffer
injury due to the failure to wear a seat belt, times the injury
that the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt may cause. The
probability that an automobile collision will occur is fairly
small, but the loss that the plaintiff might suffer due to the fail-
ure to wear a seat belt is great, and the burden of buckling a
seat belt is quite small.5 3
50. See e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 170-73 and sources cited
therein.
51. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947).
52. The cost of using an available seat belt includes four components:
risk assessment, attentiveness, tactile inconvenience and physical ef-
fort, and aesthetic loss. Risk assessment costs are incurred by each
potential user in ascertaining whether driving creates a substantial
risk of personal injury that could be significantly reduced by using a
seat belt .... [D]issemination of information [through safety cam-
paigns about the value of seat belts] clearly reduces the risk assess-
ment costs that potential seat belt users incur. Attentiveness costs are
created by attempts to remind the user to employ the seat belt and to
make the use routine.... The costs of tactile inconvenience and ac-
tual physical effort are, respectively, the value of whatever discomfort
may be caused by wearing seat belts and the energy expended in
buckling them. Aesthetic loss is a residual category of undefinable
unpleasantness that some automobile occupants apparently associate
with the use of seat belts.
Seyf-Protective Safety Devices, supra note 1, at 429 (footnotes omitted).
53. Dunn v. Durso, 219 N.J. Super. 383, 400, 530 A.2d 387, 396 (1986). It is,
of course, only foreseeable danger that one must consider under the standard
of reasonableness. See i& at 399, 530 A.2d at 396 (applying Learned Hand
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The substantial reduction of the risk of injury that results
from seat belt use is well established'and well known. The U.S.
Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic and
Safety Administration recently evaluated and compiled data
from three seat belt studies and concluded that when a person
is in the front seat of a vehicle, use of a lap/shoulder belt
reduces the risk of death by forty to fifty percent and the risk
of moderate to critical injury by forty-five to fifty-five per-
cent.-4  Other studies indicate that the use of a lap belt by a
back-seat passenger reduces the risk of death by 17 to 50 per-
cent.55 The importance of seat belt use has been highly publi-
cized in "buckle up for safety" programs. Based on this
formula to seat belt defense); Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 461-
62, 410 N.W.2d 706, 715 (1987) (same); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 452, 323
N.E.2d 164, 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 922 (1974) (same). The argument that it is
unforseeable that failure to buckle a seat belt might cause one to suffer seri-
ous injury is untenable in light of the highly publicized seat belt studies and
the "Buckle Up For Safety" campaigns during the last twenty years. In cases
adopting the seat belt defense, many courts have explicitly recognized the ef-
fectiveness of seat belts. E.g., Spier v. Barker at 452, 323 N.E.2d at 168, 363
N.Y.S.2d at 922 ("there can be no doubt whatsoever as to the efficiency of the
automobile seat belt in preventing injuries"); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 453 (Fla. 1984) ("evidence for the effectiveness of
safety belts in reducing deaths and injury severity is substantial and unequivo-
cal"). Legislative battles over laws requiring seat belt use also have increased
the awareness of the value of seat belt use.
54. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, AMENDMENT
TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD 208 PASSENGER CAR FRONT
SEAT OCCUPANT PROTECTION IV-1 to 4 (1984) [hereinafter NHTSA ANALYSIS].
This analysis was used in the development of regulations that will require au-
tomatic seat belts or air bags in all new vehicles in the United States beginning
in September 1989 unless certain requirements are met. For additional results
of the analysis and a list of the studies on which it is based, see infra notes 76-
85 and accompanying text.
55. Kahane, Fatality and Injury Reducing Effectiveness of Lap Belts for
Back Seat Occupants, SOCIETY OF AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, RESTRAINT TECH-
NOLOGIES: REAR SEAT OCCUPANT PROTECTION 45 (1987). An evaluation of ac-
cidents that occurred between 1975 and 1986 reported in the Fatal Accident
Reporting System, involving nearly 500 rear seat occupants, found rear seat
lap belts provide a 17 to 26 percent reduction in fatalities. Id. at 47. The same
study evaluated Pennsylvania accident records from 1982-85 and found a 37
percent reduction in serious or fatal injuries. Id. at 51. Dalmotas & Krzyzew-
ski, Restraint System Effectiveness as a Function of Seating Position, SOCIETY
OF AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, RESTRAINT TECHNOLOGIES: REAR SEAT OCCU-
PANT PROTECTION 75 (1987), found a 20-30 percent reduction in fatalities for
adults and a 40-50 percent reduction for children based on a study of accidents
in various Canadian provinces. Id. at 92. Campbell, The Effectiveness of Rear-
Seat Lap-Belts in Crash Injury Reduction, SOCIETY OF AUTOMOTIVE ENGI-
NEERS, RESTRAINT TECHNOLOGIES: REAR SEAT OCCUPANT PROTECTION 9
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substantial risk reduction, it is difficult to argue that a reason-
able person will not make use of an available seat belt.
(1987), found a 25 percent fatality reduction based on a study of North Caro-
lina crashes between 1979 and 1985. Id. at 9-10.
An earlier study by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of
26 frontal crashes, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, SAFETY
STUDY-PERFORMANCE OF LAP BELTS IN 26 FRONTAL CRASHES, Report No.
PB86-917006 (1986) (cited in Kahane, supra, at 45) [hereinafter NTSB STUDY],
called into question the effectiveness of rear seat lap belts. The study sug-
gested that rear seat lap belts actually may increase the risk of abdominal in-
juries. Kahane, supra, at 45. Kahane's study of the Pennsylvania records
helps to explain the difference between the findings of the NTSB study and
the other researchers. The Pennsylvania records are especially helpful, be-
cause they identify not only seat location and severity of injuries, but also
identify the part of the body that was injured and whether the collison was
frontal or nonfrontal. Id. at 45-46. Kahane found that rear seat lap belts are
much less effective in frontal collisions than nonfrontal collisions. He found
that the risk of serious injury from a nonfrontal crash is reduced by 55 percent
when an occupant wears a rear seat belt, but that the risk of serious injury
from a frontal crash is reduced by only 17 percent. Id. at 50. Kahane states:
The principal reason that lap belts are not as effective in frontal
crashes, however, is that even unrestrained back seat occupants have
lower injury risks than unrestrained drivers, due to the relatively safe
environment which the rear passenger compartment offers in those
crashes. But the back seat has no safety advantage in the nonfrontal
crashes ...
Id. at 50, 52. It is therefore not surprising that in the NTSB study, which only
examined frontal crashes, the lap belt was not found to be very effective.
Kahane's study of the Pennsylvania data also supports the NTSB study's
suggestion that lap belts increase the likelihood of abdominal injuries. Kahane
found that the use of lap belts in the back seat increased the risk of serious
torso (thorax and abdomen) injuries by 86 percent, but that it decreased the
risk of serious injuries to the head by 63 percent, to the neck and back by 49
percent, and to arms and legs by 55 percent. Id. at 50. The important factor, of
course, in determining whether a reasonable person in the back seat will wear
a seat belt is the overall effectiveness of lap belts in preventing injury from
any type of collision. Plaintiffs cannot know at the time they choose whether
or not to buckle a seat belt whether they will be in a frontal or nonfrontal
collision or what type of injury they are likely to suffer. As to the overall ef-
fectiveness of rear-seat lap belts, Kahane found, based on the Pennsylvania
records, that use of a back-seat lap belt reduces the risk of serious or fatal in-
jury by 37 percent. Id. at 51.
The argument that a plaintiff who is in a back seat is negligent for failing
to wear a lap belt is not as strong as the argument that the plaintiff in the
front seat is negligent, because the risk of injury to one seated in a back seat
without a seat belt is less than the risk of injury to one seated in a front seat
without a seat belt, and lap belts create a risk of abdominal injury. Courts,
however, have not drawn a distinction between front and back seat occupants
in the seat belt defense cases. Some courts have applied the seat belt defense
to back seat plaintiffs, but have not discussed whether a distinction between
front and back seat occupants is justified. See, e.g., Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd.,
428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706 (1987); Heiser v. Chastain, 6 Ill. App. 3d 552, 556,
285 N.E.2d 601, 604 (1972) (implying that seat belt defense might have been
available against plaintiff injured in back seat, if record had established that
1989] 1385
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
2. Should Plaintiffs Anticipate Defendants' Negligence?
Some courts have rejected the seat belt defense because
they do not want to require plaintiffs to anticipate the negli-
gence of defendants. 56 There are, however, strong arguments
against rejecting the seat belt defense on that basis.57
First, the position that the plaintiff need not anticipate the
defendant's negligence is inconsistent with other well-estab-
lished rules of law. Exposing a plaintiff to the risk that the
negligence of another will cause the plaintiff harm can consti-
tute negligence.5 8 Crashworthiness or second accident products
liability cases hold that the manufacturer of an automobile has
a duty to build a car that will provide the occupants with rea-
sonable protection from injury after a collision occurs.59 The
manufacturer must anticipate the danger of collision, and, of
course, collisions often will occur through the negligence of
another.
Second, the rule that one need not anticipate the negli-
use of seat belt would have mitigated damages). American Auto. Ass'n v.
Tehrani, 508 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), appears to be the only case to
address the question whether the seat belt defense should be limited to front
seat plaintiffs. The Tehrani court merely says:
As a matter of logic [the seat belt defense] rule must necessarily apply
to a failure to use any available seat belt in a car, not merely those in
the front seat.
Tehrani, 508 So. 2d at 370.
In light of what appears to be the substantial value of the use of lap belts
in the back seat, it is appropriate to apply the seat belt defense to back seat
plaintiffs as well as well front seat plaintiffs. As noted infra at text accompa-
nying note 67, in jurisdictions that adopt the seat belt defense, the defendant
must persuade the trier-of-fact that the plaintiff was negligent in failing to
wear a seat belt. The studies that indicate that there is less risk of injury
when one fails to wear a seat belt in the back seat than in the front seat, and
that lap belts create a risk of abdominal injuries, may enable some back seat
plaintiffs who failed to wear lap belts to persuade the trier-of-fact that they
were not negligent in failing to use a seat belt.
56. See, e.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 508, 242 So. 2d. 666, 675
(1970); Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill. 2d 129, 133, 483 N.E.2d 268, 270 (1985);
Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 133, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977).
57. See, e.g., Dahl v. BMW, 304 Or. 558, 565, 748 P.2d 77, 81 (1987) (en
banc) ("Anticipation of the dangers which are a part of driving on Oregon's
roads is a 'part of the uniform standard of behavior by the hypothetical reason-
able, prudent man.'" (quoting Cutsforth v. Kinzua Corp., 267 Or. 423, 430, 517
P.2d 640, 643 (1973))).
58. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302A (1965). "An act or
an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it in-
volves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the negligent or reck-
less conduct of the other or a third person." Id.
59. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
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gence of another has a well-recognized exception-plaintiffs
have the duty to protect themselves once they know of a spe-
cific risk.60 It is common knowledge that highway travel will
expose one to the risk of negligent driving by others. Public in-
formation campaigns that encourage people to "drive defen-
sively" and campaigns that warn of the dangers caused by
drunk drivers explicitly inform the public of the danger that
others will drive negligently. People who travel on the high-
way should know of the risk that others will be negligent and
should take steps to avoid harm.
Finally, failure to wear a seat belt is probably negligent,
even if plaintiffs are not required to anticipate the negligence
of others. When plaintiffs travel on the highway, they are not
just risking the danger that they will be injured due to the neg-
ligence of another. They also risk the danger that they will be
injured in an accident in which no one is negligent or in which
they themselves are negligent. The burden of buckling a seat
belt is so small that the failure to use a seat belt is probably
negligent even if that burden is compared only with the risk
that the plaintiff will be injured due to an accident that is not
caused by someone else's negligence.61
3. Community Practice Not To Wear Seat Belts
Some courts have rejected the seat belt defense because the
majority of citizens do not wear seat belts.62 In observational
surveys conducted by the Department of Transportation's Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration in nineteen cities
nationwide in 1983, only fourteen percent of drivers and ap-
proximately eight and a half percent of front right passengers
60. See, e.g., Junker v. Ziegler, 113 Ill. 2d 332, 338, 498 N.E.2d 1135, 1137
(1986) (noting that, although there is no duty to anticipate the negligence of
another, there is a duty to protect oneself once danger becomes known).
61. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 50-53 (describing Hand's mathe-
matical terms for expressing negligence).
62. In Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 133, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977), the
court stated, "[I]t is a fact and persuasive that the majority of motorists do not
habitually use their seat belts." See also McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 725
(D.C. 1976) ("[To hold that failure to use a seat belt amounts to negligence
assumes that the usual practice of car drivers and passengers is to use these
devices. Statistics on the subject refute any such assumption."); Kopischke v.
First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 495, 610 P.2d 668, 680 (1980) (quoting
Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 133, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977)); Miller v. Miller,
273 N.C. 228, 238, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1968) (doubting that rule denying all recov-




were wearing seat belts.63 Nevertheless, the fact that the ma-
jority of citizens do not use seat belts does not mean the failure
to wear a seat belt is reasonable. Generally, a practice may
serve as evidence that the practice is reasonable, but does not
establish as a matter of law that the practice is reasonable.64
As Justice Holmes said:
What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but
what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence,
whether it usually is complied with or not.
6 5
Consequently, the fact that the majority of citizens do not use
seat belts should not be the basis for rejection of the seat belt
defense.
Moreover, states that base their rejection of the seat belt
defense on nonuse of seat belts by the majority may need to re-
evaluate their rejection of the defense in light of increased seat
belt use following the enactment of mandatory seat belt use
laws. Such seat belt statutes are likely to push seat belt use
well above fifty percent.66
4. The Plaintiff's Negligence: An Issue of Fact or Law?
The jurisdictions that allow the seat belt defense all con-
sider the question whether the failure to wear a seat belt is
negligent as an issue for the trier-of-fact.67 No jurisdictions
consider the failure to wear a seat belt negligent as a matter of
law. Generally, courts hold that a practice is negligent as a
matter of law only if the practice is so clearly negligent that
reasonable persons would have to conclude that it is
negligent.68
Courts are understandably reluctant to label a practice as
63. NHTSA ANALYsIs, supra note 54, at V-2.
64. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 193-96.
65. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903); see also The
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.) (citing "precautions so imperative that
even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission"), cert denied,
287 U.S. 662 (1932).
66. Figures compiled by the NHTSA indicate that in the seventeen coun-
tries that have passed mandatory seat belt use laws, seat belt use has jumped
to an average of 66% and remained high. NHTSA STANDARD, supra note 38,
at 56-57.
67. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Alaska 1986);
Franklin v. Gibson, 138 Cal. App. 3d 340, 342-43, 188 Cal. Rptr. 23, 24 (1982);
Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 462, 410 N.W.2d 706, 715-16 (1987);
Dunn v. Durso, 219 N.J. Super. 383, 401, 530 A.2d 387, 396-97 (1986); see also
Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F. Supp. 1561, 1564 (D. Vt. 1985).
68. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 217 ("A decision of an ap-
pellate court that under certain circumstances... conduct is clearly negligent
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negligent per se. Nevertheless, the burden of buckling a safety
belt is so slight, the risk of not buckling is so great, and that
risk is now sufficiently well known,69 that courts should con-
sider the failure of a plaintiff to use a seat belt under ordinary
circumstances70 negligent as a matter of law. Justice Cardozo
warned of: "[Tihe need for caution in framing standards of be-
havior that amount to rules of law. The need is the more ur-
gent when there is no background of experience out of which
the standards have emerged." 71 However, we have had sub-
stantial experience with seat belts and the evidence of their ef-
fectiveness is overwhelming. On this issue, therefore,
defendants should not be subject to a jury determination that
might be influenced by jury sympathy or the jurors' own prac-
tices concerning seat belt use.72
5. Failure to Use a Seat Belt When Protected by an Air Bag
In the near future, air bags will be a common feature in a
substantial percentage of American automobiles. Beginning
with the 1990 models, all Chrysler automobiles will have air
bags on the driver's side, all Ford Lincoln Continentals will
have air bags for both the driver and front seat passengers, and
air bags will be available on eleven other Ford models.73 It is
likely that air bags will be a standard feature on all American
vehicles within a few years. No reported cases have dealt with
the question of whether the seat belt defense applies when a
plaintiff who is protected by an air bag fails to use a seat belt.
It is likely that there will be a substantial number of such cases
in the near future.
... establishes a precedent for other cases.... To that extent it may define the
standard of reasonable conduct which the community requires.").
69. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
70. For a discussion of whether failure to wear a seat belt while in a seat
that is protected by an air bag is negligent, see infra text accompanying notes
73-97.
71. Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105, (1934); see also PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 48, at 217-19 (discussing decisions as precedential rules of
law).
72. Although courts instruct jurors that they are to judge the plaintiff by
the standard of the reasonable prudent person, jurors are likely to be influ-
enced by their own behavior. Studies indicate that in countries that do not
have mandatory seat belt use laws, the majority of people do not wear seat
belts. NHTSA STANDARD, supra note 38, at 56-57.
73. McNeil!Lehrer Newshour (PBS television broadcast, June 22, 1988).
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a. The Reduction of Risk Provided by Air Bags and Seat Belts
Experts generally agree that air bags will function well in
frontal collisions involving speeds up to forty-five miles per
hour.74 Air bags will provide little or no protection in rear end
collisions, however, and there is uncertainty about the amount
,of protection they will provide in side or angle impacts, in rol-
lover crashes, and in catastrophic frontal crashes.75
Seat belts plus air bags provide substantially more protec-
tion than air bags alone. In 1984, the Department of Transpor-
tation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA") evaluated and compiled data76 from several seat
belt77 and air bag78 studies. NHTSA expresses the effectiveness
of seat belts and air bags by stating the percentage reduction in
risk of death or injury when a seat belt or air bag is used com-
pared with the use of neither device. 79 When air bags alone
protect occupants, risk of occupant death is reduced by twenty
to forty percent.80 When air bags and lap/shoulder belts pro-
tect occupants, however, the risk of death is reduced by forty-
five to fifty-five percent.8 1 The effectiveness of lap/shoulder
belts alone, air bags alone, and air bags with lap/shoulder belts
is as follows:
74. NHTSA ANALYSIS, supra note 54, at IV-81.
75. Id.
76. The analysis of these studies is part of the basis for the Department of
Transportation's regulation requiring mandatory passive restraints in vehicles
beginning with the 1990 models unless states with a total of two-thirds of the
United States population adopt mandatory seat belt use laws. See NHTSA
STANDARD, supra note 38, at 1.
77. The seat belt studies from which data were evaluated and compiled
were the National Crash Severity Study; the 1979 to 1982 National Accident
Sampling System, and the Restraint System Evaluation Project. NHTSA
ANALYSIS, supra note 54, at IV-3 to IV-4. The NHTSA's analysis of the studies
and data, as well as its analysis of other studies, is contained in id., IV-3 to IV-
16.
78. The NHTSA prepared four separate studies using different methodol-
ogies. Id. at IV-47 to IV-48. The results of these studies are presented at id.
IV-47 to IV-77. NHTSA also evaluated three other studies, Wilson & Savage,
Restraint System Effectiveness-A Study of Fatal Accidents, PROCEEDINGS:
AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY ENGINEERING SEMINAR (June 20-21, 1973) (conducted by
General Motors Safety Research and Development Laboratory), cited id. at
IV-77; Grush, Henson & Ritterling, Restraint System Effectiveness, Report No.
S-71-40, Ford Motor Company, Automotive Safety Affairs Office (September
21, 1971), cited id. at IV-79; and Huelke, et al., Effectiveness of Current and
Future Restraint Systems in Fatal and Serious Injury Automobile Crashes,
SAE 790323 (1979), cited id. at IV-80.
79. Id. at IV-1.




Percentage Reduction in Risk
When Compared With No Safety Device 2
Manual Air Bag
Lap/ With Lap/
Shoulder Air Bag Shoulder
Injury Belt Alone Belt
Fatalities8 3  40-50 20-40 45-55
Moderate
to Critical84  45-55 25-45 50-60
Minor8 5  10 10 10
b. Effect of Air Bags on the Seat Belt Defense
Protecting with an air bag a seat occupied by a plaintiff al-
ters two factors in the calculation of whether failure to wear a
seat belt is negligent. These factors are the risk of harm and
the foreseeability of the risk of harm. 6
As discussed previously,8 7 when reasonable people sit in a
seat that is not protected by an air bag, they will weigh the bur-
den of buckling the seat belt against the foreseeable risk of
harm. Although front seat occupants may not specifically
know that if they buckle their seat belts their risk of death is
reduced by forty to fifty percent, 8 public information cam-
paigns and warnings on vehicles and owners manuals have in-
formed the public sufficiently of the reduction in risk provided
by seat belts that reasonable people will buckle their seat belts.
The calculation of reasonable people who sit in seats pro-
tected by air bags is somewhat different. The air bag alone
reduces the risk of death by twenty to forty percent, but the ad-
dition of a lap/shoulder belt reduces the risk of death by forty-
five to fifty-five percent.8 9 This is a sufficient increase in the
reduction of risk, when compared with the small burden of
buckling up, that if reasonable people know of the reduction of
risk, they are likely to use seat belts, even in seats protected by
air bags.
82. This chart is adapted from a chart appearing at id.
83. In the NHTSA chart, the severity of injury is expressed in terms of
the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS). Id Fatality (AIS injury level 6) indicates
that the injury is "[m]aximum, currently untreatable." Id. at IV-3.
84. Moderate to critical injuries range from AIS injury level 5, "[c]ritical
(e.g., major spinal cord injury, critical organ injuries)," id-, to AIS injury level
2, "[m]oderate (e.g. simple fracture)." Id
85. AIS injury level 1, "[m]inor (e.g., simple cuts or bruises)". Id
86. See infra text accompanying notes 92-95.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.




Under a negligence standard, however, the plaintiff is only
required to consider the foreseeable risk of harm. A person sit-
ting in a seat protected by an air bag must consider the foresee-
able risk of injury from failure to buckle a seat belt. Those
who purchase vehicles with air bags should be on notice that
they should buckle their seat belts, because vehicles equipped
with air bags come with warnings in operator's manuals.90
Other occupants of vehicles equipped with air bags, however,
may not be on notice of the limitations of air bags. There have
not yet been extensive safety campaigns emphasizing the im-
portance of buckling seat belts in cars with air bags.91 By the
time the 1990 models are sold, however, the public will proba-
bly know the importance of seat belt use in vehicles protected
by air bags. Warnings that people protected by air bags should
continue to use seat belts accompanied announcements that the
1990 models would include air bags.92 Department of Transpor-
tation publicity about air bags emphasizes the importance of
continuing to use seat belts. 93 The marketing of the 1990 mod-
els is likely to include substantial publicity about the safety of
air bags,94 and this publicity will probably include warnings
about the continued importance of safety belt use.
95
Although courts may allow the seat belt defense in cases in
which plaintiffs were protected by air bags, some juries may not
find that the failure to buckle seat belts under those circum-
90. The vast majority of people who are protected by an air bag probably
will be owners, because most 1990 vehicles that are equipped with air bags will
provide air bags only on the driver's side. See supra text accompanying note
73.
91. Cases involving accidents that occur prior to extensive publicity about
the importance of seat belt use in vehicles equipped with air bags also may
raise questions such as whether the owner of a vehicle equipped with an air
bag has a duty to warn occupants to buckle their seat belts.
92. See, e.g., McNeillLehrer, supra note 73.
93. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NATIONAL HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION CONSUMER INFORMATION, RELEASE, AIR
BAGS (October 1987), a sheet of information on air bags discussing operation,
reliability, and cost. Only two portions of the text are in bold print. At the
beginning: "An air bag should always be used in combination with safety
belts." Id. At the end: "Again, remember to wear a safety belt too so that you
are protected in all types of crashes." Id.
94. On the McNeil/Lehrer News Hour, Marianne Keller, identified as an
auto analyst from a New York brokerage firm, suggested Chrysler's decision to
be the first to provide air bags as standard equipment its 1990 models was a
wise marketing action by Lee Iacocca. McNeil/Lehrer, supra note 73.
95. Otherwise, manufacturers will expose themselves to risk of products
liability actions based on a failure to warn. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 48, at 697-98 (discussing failure to warn).
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stances is negligent. Under the seat belt defenses presently rec-
ognized, the jury determines whether the failure to wear a seat
belt constitutes negligence.9 6 A jury may determine that it is
not yet common knowledge that one should wear a seat belt in
a vehicle equipped with an air bag and that to use a seat belt in
such a situation is not negligent. Though this Article argues
that the failure to wear a seat belt generally should constitute
negligence as a matter of law,97 there has been so little experi-
ence with air bags, and public knowledge concerning air bags is
so limited, that it is probably appropriate for the trier-of-fact to
determine whether the failure to wear a seat belt in a seat pro-
tected by an air bag is negligent.
C. CONSISTENCY OF THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE WITH EXISTING
RULES OF LAW
Many courts have rejected the seat belt defense because it
differs from the other defenses developed at common law.98
Although the seat belt defense differs from contributory negli-
gence, comparative negligence, and the avoidable consequences
defenses, the principles underlying those defenses actually jus-
tify the seat belt defense.99 The developing crashworthiness
doctrine also has many similarities to the seat belt defense. 10 0
Adoption of the seat belt defense is more consistent with the
underlying principles of the common law than rejection of the
seat belt defense.
1. Contributory and Comparative Negligence
Initially, many courts rejected the seat belt defense by not-
ing its differences from contributory and comparative negli-
gence. 10 1 Contributory negligence is a complete defense that
96. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
98. See, e.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 508, 242 So. 2d 666, 675
(1970) (noting practical effect would be same result as "comparative negli-
gence," which Alabama does not recognize); see also McCord v. Green, 362
A.2d 720, 722-23 (D.C. 1976) (noting courts that treat failure to use seat belts as
contributory negligence are unduly impressed by belts' effectiveness); Miller v.
Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 239-40, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73-74 (1968) (citing harshness of a
rule that would deny plaintiff all recovery for failing to buckle belt); Fields v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla. 1976) (refusing to require
plaintiff to anticipate negligence of others).
99. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 108-12.
101. E.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 489, 508, 242 So. 2d 666, 675 (1970)
(comparing to unrecognized doctrine of comparative negligence); Lipscomb v.
1989] 1393
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
courts apply when the plaintiff's negligence causes the acci-
dent.10 2 Under comparative negligence, when the plaintiff's
negligence is a cause of the accident, the court reduces the
plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of the fault attributed to
the plaintiff.1 0 3 The seat belt defense does differ from contribu-
tory and comparative negligence in that the seat belt defense
applies when the negligence of the plaintiff prior to the acci-
dent causes only a portion of the injuries.
Despite that difference, it is inconsistent for courts to deny
or reduce the plaintiff's recovery under contributory or com-
parative negligence when the plaintiff's negligence is a cause of
the entire injury, while allowing the plaintiff full recovery
when the plaintiff's negligence is a cause of a portion of that
injury. Assume two cases. One plaintiff is driving slightly over
a safe speed while wearing a seat belt and a second is driving
safely but fails to wear a seat belt. Each is involved in a colli-
sion with a negligent defendant. Each plaintiff is severely in-
jured as a result of the collision. Assume that if the plaintiff
who failed to wear a seat belt had worn a seat belt, that plain-
tiff would have suffered only slight injury. The failure of the
seat beltless plaintiff to wear a seat belt is a cause of the exac-
erbation damages, but in a jurisdiction that rejects the seat belt
defense, a court would allow the plaintiff full recovery. In the
other case, the speeding plaintiff's negligence is a cause of that
plaintiff's injuries. In a contributory negligence jurisdiction, a
court would deny that plaintiff any recovery and in a compara-
tive negligence jurisdiction, a court would reduce that plain-
tiff's recovery based on that plaintiff's relative fault. Does
anything justify the difference in treatment of the plaintiffs?
The fact that the plaintiff's negligence caused part of the plain-
tiff's damages in the seat belt defense case and the fact that it
caused all of the plaintiff's damages in the contributory or com-
parative negligence case does not justify the difference in treat-
ment. In neither case should a court allow the plaintiff a full
recovery of damages that the plaintiff negligently caused.
The seat belt defense is different from contributory and
comparative negligence, but its difference concerns an insignifi-
Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 917 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967) (citing difficulty of applying
such theories in seat belt situation); McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 723 (D.C.
1976) (refusing to equate failure to use belts with other types of contributory
negligence); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 237-38, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1968) (re-
fusing to treat as contributory negligence).
102. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 451-52.
103. See, e.g., id. at 470-74.
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cant factor: the seat belt defense applies in situations in which
the plaintiff's negligence caused a part, rather than all of the
plaintiff's damages. The seat belt defense is similar to contrib-
utory and comparative negligence in the most significant factor:
it limits the plaintiff's recovery of those damages that the
plaintiff's own negligence caused. Underlying contributory
negligence, comparative negligence, and the seat belt defense is
the principle that plaintiffs should be responsible for all or a
portion of the loss caused by their negligence. 10 4
2. The Avoidable Consequences Rule
Although some courts have rejected the seat belt defense
because, unlike contributory or comparative negligence, the
plaintiff's negligence causes only part of the plaintiff's injuries,
courts deny plaintiffs recovery of that portion of their damages
caused by their own negligence occurring after the accident
under the avoidable consequences rule. Several courts that
have adopted the seat belt defense have found an analogy be-
tween the seat belt defense and the avoidable consequences
rule.105
Under the avoidable consequences or duty to mitigate rule,
courts do not allow plaintiffs to recover for those damages that
104. Some courts and commentators have suggested that a seat belt defense
is more consistent with comparative negligence than with contributory negli-
gence. See, e.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 508, 242 So. 2d 666, 675
(1970); Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147, 151, 755 P.2d 1135, 1139 (1988);
Kircher, supra note 1, at 188; Hoglund & Parsons, Caveat Viator: The Duty to
Wear Seat Belts Under Comparative Negligence Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 1, 14-
15 (1974). The seat belt defense is like comparative fault in that plaintiffs may
be allowed recovery of only a part of their damages. Whether the seat belt de-
fense is like comparative negligence in the more significant sense that respon-
sibility for damages caused by the negligence of both the plaintiff and the
defendant is shared based on the relative fault of the parties, depends on the
type of seat belt defense. As discussed below, infra text accompanying notes
167-88, under a no-exacerbation-damages-recovery seat belt defense, the plain-
tiff is not allowed any recovery of damages caused by failure to wear a seat
belt. Division of responsibility for these damages is not based on relative fault.
Under the seat belt defense advocated in this Article, infra text accompanying
notes 246-99, responsibility for that portion of the damages caused by the negli-
gence of both the parties is divided based on their relative fault. The seat belt
defense proposed in this Article is consistent with comparative fault. The no-
exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense is not.
105. E.g., Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Alaska 1986); Spier v.
Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 451-52, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 921-22




the plaintiffs could have avoided by exercising reasonable care
after the initial injury. As Prosser & Keeton suggests:
[The avoidable consequences rule] denies recovery for any damages
which could have been avoided by reasonable conduct on the part of
the plaintiff.... [It] comes into play after a legal wrong has occurred,
but while some damages may still be averted, and bars recovery only
for such damages. Thus, if the plaintiff is injured in an automobile
collision, his contributorily negligent driving before the collision will
prevent any recovery at all, but his failure to obtain proper medical
care for his broken leg will bar only his damages for the subsequent
aggravated condition of the leg.
1 0 6
Both the contributory negligence rule and the avoidable conse-
quences rule "rest upon the same fundamental policy of mak-
ing recovery depend upon the plaintiff's proper care for the
protection of his own interests .... ,,107
The seat belt defense is similar to the avoidable conse-
quences rule because it results in plaintiffs receiving only a par-
tial recovery because of their negligence. Courts reduce
plaintiffs' damages to the extent that their negligence caused
their injuries. The seat belt defense is not identical to either
the contributory negligence or the avoidable consequences rule,
but all three defenses are based on the premise that people
should not recover for injuries that their own negligence
caused. The contributory negligence rule recognizes that this
principle applies to negligence occurring before the injury. The
avoidable consequences rule recognizes that this principle ap-
plies when the plaintiff's negligence causes only a part of the
injury suffered.
3. The Crashworthiness Rule
A recently developed doctrine that is comparable to the
seat belt defense is the "crashworthiness" or "second accident"
rule of products liability.10 8 A crashworthiness claim against a
vehicle manufacturer arises when the vehicle is involved in a
collision and the plaintiffs allege that the manufacturer should
106. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 458 (footnotes omitted).
107. Id.
108. In a recent seat belt defense case in which the plaintiff's claim was
based on a crashworthiness theory, the Michigan Supreme Court pointed out
the similarities in the two doctrines, noting the irony that "one of plaintiff's
theories of liability is indeed premised upon the foreseeability of automobile
accidents." Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 460, 410 N.W.2d 706, 715
(1987). Other courts also have noted the similarities between the crashworthi-
ness doctrine and the seat belt defense. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 452 (Fla. 1984); Dahl v. BMW, 304 Or. 558, 568, 748
P.2d 77, 83 (1987) (en banc).
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have designed the vehicle so the injuries suffered by the occu-
pants would not have been as great. 0 9 The plaintiffs allege
that they would have suffered less injury if the dashboard had
been padded, if the door had not opened on impact, and so
forth. In these cases, as in seat belt defense cases, the plaintiffs
have suffered exacerbation damages. In the seat belt cases, ex-
acerbation damages are damages the plaintiffs would not have
suffered had they worn seat belts. In the crashworthiness
cases, the exacerbation damages are those damages that the
plaintiffs would not have suffered had the manufacturer built
the vehicle in a crashworthy manner.
Initially, some courts denied plaintiffs recovery in
crashworthiness cases on the basis that a collision was not the
purpose of the vehicle.110 Nevertheless, courts generally have
held that manufacturers are liable for exacerbation damages in
crashworthiness cases based on the fact that a collision is
foreseeable. 1"
The seat belt defense is to plaintiffs what the crashworthi-
ness rule is to defendants. Under each, the parties are held re-
sponsible if their negligence causes exacerbation of damages.
Plaintiffs' and defendants' responsibility to act so as not to
cause unreasonable risk finds expression in the defendants' lia-
bility for negligence and in the plaintiffs' reduction of recovery
in contributory and comparative negligence cases. Plaintiffs'
and defendants' responsibility to exercise reasonable care to
mnmze the extent of injury finds expression in the defend-
ants' liability in crashworthiness cases and the plaintiffs' limita-
tion of recovery in seat belt defense cases.
Arguably, the crashworthiness/seat belt defense analogy
breaks down because courts should require a greater amount of
care of vehicle manufacturers than they require of vehicle oc-
cupants. Manufacturers are in the business of manufacturing
vehicles and have a greater responsibility to be aware of the
risks of collisions and the types of injuries that can occur and to
take steps to avoid such risks. Admittedly, it is proper to re-
quire greater knowledge of risk and to impose a greater burden
109. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-02 (8th Cir.
1968); Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 470, 410 N.W.2d 706, 719
(1987).
110. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir.
1966), overruled by Nuff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir.
1977).




of safety on the manufacturer than on the vehicle occupant.
Courts should hold manufacturers to the standard of a reason-
able manufacturer in negligence actions, but they should hold
vehicle occupants to the standard of a reasonable person.11 2
That standard requires vehicle occupants to foresee the likeli-
hood of an automobile collision, to know the value of seat belt
use, and to take the minimal step of using a seat belt. A vehicle
occupant's failure to take reasonable precautions to minimize
the extent of injuries should reduce that occupant's recovery of
exacerbation damages, just as the failure of a manufacturer to
take reasonable precautions to minimize the extent of injury
should subject the manufacturer to liability in the crashworthi-
ness cases.
4. Inconsistency and the Rejection of the Seat Belt Defense
Not only does the seat belt defense share the underlying
principles of contributory negligence, comparative negligence,
the avoidable consequences rule, and the crashworthiness
rule,113 but the rejection of the seat belt defense would be
highly inconsistent with these defenses. If a jurisdiction rejects
the seat belt defense, a plaintiff can recover damages in full
from a defendant for injuries that were caused in part by the
negligence of the plaintiff. A few rules of law have permitted a
full recovery by a plaintiff who was at fault, but courts have re-
jected most such rules. Butterfield v. Forrester114 recognized
the contributory negligence defense in England in 1809, and the
court's opinion suggests that even at that time, the contributory
negligence defense was widely accepted.115 The last clear
chance rule allowed negligent plaintiffs a full recovery if the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury,1 16 but
most commentators view the last clear chance doctrine as an
112. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 99-112.
114. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809) (per curiam).
115. Id. In his opinion, Lord Ellenborough presents the rule as if it already
were widely accepted. There is no discussion of the policy for the rule. He
merely states:
One person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordi-
nary care for himself. Two things must concur to support this action,
an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want
of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.
IM at 927.
The fact that the contributory negligence defense was accepted so quickly,
with so little indication that it ran counter to a prior rule, indicates that it may
have been a well established rule. See Prosser, supra note 17, at 467-69.
116. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 462-63.
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aberration in the law whose only purpose was to avoid the
harsh, no-recovery character of contributory negligence. 117
Most of the jurisdictions that have examined the last clear
chance doctrine under comparative fault principles have re-
jected it, and have allowed the jury to reduce the recovery of
negligent plaintiffs in such cases.11 8 Many of the early strict
products liability cases allowed plaintiffs a full recovery of
damages caused both by the defectiveness of the product and a
plaintiff's own negligence.1 1 9 Now, however, in strict products
liability cases, most courts apply comparative fault.1 20
Consequently, not only is adoption of the seat belt defense
consistent with the underlying principles of tort law, but rejec-
tion of the seat belt defense is highly inconsistent with existing
rules of tort law.
D. MANDATORY SEAT BELT USE STATUTES AND THE SEAT
BELT DEFENSE
Many countries other than the United States have had stat-
utes requiring seat belt use for several years.1 21 These statutes
have proven to be quite effective at encouraging seat belt use
and saving lives.122 In 1984, the U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation's National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration
adopted a standard that requires the installation of either air
bags or automatic seat belts in all new cars beginning with the
1990 models, unless states enact mandatory front-seat seat belt
use statutes that cover two-thirds of the United States
population.1 23
117. See, e.g., id. at 464 & n.11.
118. See, e.g., id. at 477 & n.82 and cases cited therein.
119. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 712 & n.7.
120. See id. at 478 & n.94.
121. The NHTSA reports that the following countries enacted statutes
mandating seat belt use effective on the indicated dates: Australia (1-72), New
Zealand (6-72), France (7-73), Puerto Rico (1-74), Sweden (1-75), Norway (19-
75), Denmark (1-76), Austria (7-76), South Africa (12-77), Ireland (2-79), Great
Britain (1-83). See NHTSA STANDARD, supra note 38, at 57.
122. See id. at 56-57.
123. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, § s4.1.5 (1987). The state mandatory use statute
must contain:
A provision specifying that the violation of the belt usage requirement
may be used to mitigate damages with respect to any person who is
involved in a passenger car-accident while violating the belt usage re-
quirement and who seeks in any subsequent litigation to recover dam-
ages for injuries resulting from the accident.
Id. § 571.208, § s4.1.5.2(c)(2) (emphasis added). Very few of the state statutes
contain such a provision. See supra notes 32-34.
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Since the passage of that standard, twenty-nine states have
enacted statutes that require front-seat occupants to wear seat
belts.124 Some of the statutes do not mention the seat belt de-
fense,1 25 others prohibit the seat belt defense,126 and some pro-
hibit the use of the statute to establish that the plaintiff was
negligent in failing to use a seat belt.127
This section will discuss the effect of each of these types of
statutes on the seat belt defense, and whether a court should
leave the question of the seat belt defense to the legislature
when the legislature has not passed legislation concerning
either the seat belt defense or seat belt use.
1. Mandatory Use Statutes That Do Not Mention the Seat
Belt Defense
Two states have enacted mandatory use statutes that do
not mention the seat belt defense. 128 Such statutes may di-
rectly affect the seat belt defense in two ways.
First, states that have rejected the seat belt defense be-
cause there is no duty to wear a seat belt 1 29 may find such a
duty in the mandatory use statute. Some of the states that re-
jected the seat belt defense on the no duty basis prior to the
passage of the mandatory use statutes specifically noted that
the legislature had not created such a duty. 3 0
A second effect that such mandatory use statutes may have
on the seat belt defense is that courts may find that such stat-
utes establish a negligence standard. Courts use a statute to es-
tablish the standard of conduct in negligence actions if the
legislature designed the statute to protect the injured person
from the type of injury suffered. 1 3 1 The apparent purpose of
the mandatory use statutes is to prevent occupants of vehicles
from suffering exacerbation of injuries due to vehicle collisions.
This is precisely the type of injury at issue in seat belt defense
cases. Consequently, courts that recognize the seat belt defense
probably will find that plaintiffs may use such statutes to estab-
lish a negligence standard of conduct.
In most states, a violation of a statute used to establish the
124. See supra note 31.
125. See supra note 35.
126. See supra note 33.
127. See supra note 32.
128. See supra note 35.
129. See supra note 42.
130. See supra note 49.
131. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 222-27.
1400 [Vol. 73:1369
SEAT BELT DEFENSE
standard of conduct constitutes negligence per se. If people vio-
late a statute, their negligence is established unless they can
show an excuse.132 Violation of a statute can establish the
plaintiff's contributory or comparative negligence, 133 as well as
the defendant's negligence. If statutes mandating seat belt use
establish the negligence standard for seat belt defense pur-
poses, it will be much easier for defendants to establish that
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt was negligent.
2. No Right to Act Like a Fool, but the Right to Full
Recovery if You Do: Mandatory Use Statutes That
Prohibit the Seat Belt Defense and Statutes
That Prohibit the Use of the Statute
to Establish the Seat Belt Defense
Several states that have enacted mandatory use statutes
either prohibit the seat belt defense 13 4 or prohibit the use of
the statute to establish the seat belt defense.1 35 In other juris-
dictions, it is not clear whether the statute prohibits the seat
belt defense in cases in which the plaintiff's failure to wear a
seat belt is a violation of the statute, or merely prevents the use
of the statute to establish the seat belt defense.136
a. Mandatory Use Statutes That Prohibit
the Seat Belt Defense
There is a basic inconsistency in statutes that require seat
belt use and prohibit the seat belt defense. 137 When the legisla-
ture prohibits citizens from traveling in a vehicle without using
seat belts, it is denying them the right to engage in activity that
exposes only themselves to a risk. Mandatory use statutes run
counter to a strong tradition against protecting citizens from
themselves. Such statutes may be justified because they impose
a minimal burden on citizens and can lead to a substantial sav-
ing of life.138 Nevertheless, these factors, the minimal burden
of buckling up and the great risk of not buckling up, are the
very factors that make the plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt
132. See, e.g., id- at 227-29 and cases cited therein. Some courts have held
that violation of a statute is only evidence of negligence. See id. at 230-31.
133. See, e.g, icL at 231-33 and cases cited therein.
134. See supra note 33.
135. See supra note 32.
136. See supra note 33.
137. Statutes that require seat belt use and prohibit the seat belt defense
are cited at supra note 32.
138. Cf supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
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negligent. It does not seem fair to deny a defendant the right
to show the factors the statute assumes. Moreover, if the plain-
tiff is negligent, it does not seem fair to impose on the defend-
ant the full loss suffered because of the plaintiff's negligence.
It may be proper for the legislature to tell citizens that they
cannot act like fools, but when citizens do act like fools, the leg-
islature should not require defendants to pay the full measure
of the loss.139
b. Mandatory Use Statutes That May Not be Used to Establish
the Seat Belt Defense
Statutes that require seat belt use but deny the defendant
the right to use the statute to establish the seat belt defense 40
are less inconsistent than those that prohibit the seat belt de-
fense. Legislatures that have passed such statutes recognize the
importance of seat belt use, yet are unwilling to allow their
judgment to affect civil suits. Those legislatures leave develop-
ment of the seat belt defense to the judiciary.
Although defendants may not use such statutes directly to
establish the seat belt defense, it may be that in some jurisdic-
tions the statutes will encourage the development of the seat
belt defense. Those courts that reject the seat belt defense be-
cause the majority of citizens do not use seat belts14 . may adopt
the seat belt defense if, in response to the statute, the majority
of citizens begin to use seat belts. If the majority of citizens be-
gin to use seat belts, courts may allow that use as evidence that
failure to wear a seat belt is negligent.142 In addition, if the
mandatory use statutes cause the public to consider failure to
use a seat belt unreasonable, jury determinations of whether
failure to wear a seat belt is negligent are likely to reflect that
consensus.
139. The inconsistency between requiring use of seat belts and prohibiting
the use of the seat belt defense, of course, is not the only inconsistency in the
law. The inconsistency in these seat belt statutes may be a function of legisla-
tive compromise. It may be a function of an indulgent, paternalistic govern-
ment. The legislature tells citizens what to do for their own safety, and when
they ar injured because they do not comply, the legislature makes someone
else bear the full cost.
140. See supra note 32.
141. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 193-96 (discussing cus-
tom as establishing standard of reasonable conduct).
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c. Statute Ambiguity: Prohibition of the Seat Belt Defense or
Prohibition of the Use of the Statute to Establish
the Seat Belt Defense
Several mandatory use statutes143 contain ambiguous lan-
guage similar to that in the following Illinois statute:
Failure to wear a seat safety belt in violation of this Section shall not
be considered evidence of negligence, shall not limit the liability of an
insurer, and shall not diminish any recovery for damages arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.' 4 4
Is it the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt or the fact that
the failure to wear a seat belt was a violation of the statute that
may not be considered evidence of negligence? The answer is
unclear from the language of such statutes.
To avoid unreasonable results, courts should interpret the
statutes only to prohibit use of the statute to diminish recovery.
Courts should allow the seat belt defense if defendants can es-
tablish the defense without using the statute. The statutes do
not require seat belt use of back seat occupants and several
other categories of occupants. 45 Interpretation of the statutes
to prohibit the seat belt defense whenever the failure to wear a
seat belt is a violation of the statute, would create the anoma-
lous result that front seat plaintiffs who violated the statute
would not have their recovery reduced and back seat plaintiffs,
or other plaintiffs not required to use a seat belt, could have
their recovery reduced.146 According to a well-recognized ca-
143. See supra note 33.
144. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 12-603.1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
145. The Illinois statute is typical. The following also are not required to
use seat belts:
1. A driver or passenger frequently stopping and leaving the ve-
hicle or delivering property from the vehicle, if the speed of the vehi-
cle between stops does not exceed 15 miles per hour.
2. A driver or passenger possessing a written statement from a
physician that such person is unable, for medical or physical reasons,
to wear a safety belt.
4. A driver operating a motor vehicle in reverse.
5. A motor vehicle with a model year prior to 1965.
9. A motor vehicle operated by a rural letter carrier of the
United States postal service while performing duties as a rural letter
carrier.
Id ch. 95 1/2, para. 12-603.1(b).
146. The Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility of a simi-
lar anomaly under its mitigation cap statute, which applies only to front seat
occupants. Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 469, 410 N.W.2d 706,
718-19 (1987). See infra text accompanying notes 228-36 (discussing inconsis-
tent treatment of front and back seat occupants).
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non of statutory interpretation, in interpreting ambiguous stat-
utes courts should favor interpretations that create reasonable
results over those that create unreasonable results. 147 Thus, to
avoid an unreasonable distinction between front and back seat
occupants, courts should interpret statutes such as the Illinois
statute to prohibit only the use of the statute to establish the
seat belt defense.
3. Mandatory Use Statutes that Establish a Seat Belt Defense
Mitigation Cap
Three mandatory use statutes establish the seat belt de-
fense but limit reduction of the plaintiff's recovery to one to
five percent of the plaintiff's total damages. 148 Because these
statutes recognize the seat belt defense and raise issues con-
cerning the proper reduction of damages when one fails to wear
a seat belt, discussion of the statutes appears in Part III of this
Article.149
4. The Seat Belt Defense Where the Legislature Has Not
Spoken Concerning Seat Belt Use or The Seat Belt
Defense
Half of the states do not have statutes concerning the seat
belt defense or mandatory seat belt use. The lack of legislative
pronouncement raises the issue of whether courts in such states
should adopt the seat belt defense or leave the question to the
legislature. Several courts have held that recognition of the
seat belt defense would be such a substantial change in the
common law that it should be left to the legislature.15 0 There is
good reason for courts to move slowly in the development of
the common law. People rely on precedent. Society bases part
of the respect it gives to courts on the belief that courts dis-
cover established principles of law, and making dramatic
changes undercuts the foundation for this belief. As shown in
147. As one court noted: "It has been called a golden rule of statutory in-
terpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alter-
native possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that
interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result."
United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 522 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting 2A N. SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 45.12 (Sands 4th ed. 1984)).
148. See supra note 34.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 221-45 (discussing mitigation cap
statutes).
150. E.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 508, 242 So. 2d 666, 675 (1970);
Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 916 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Fields v. Volk-
swagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla. 1976).
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an earlier section,' 51 however, although courts did not specifi-
cally recognize the seat belt defense at common law, it is based
on well-established principles of the common law, and failure
to adopt the defense would be contrary to those principles.
Some states have decided specifically not to require vehicle
occupants to wear a seat belt. 52 In such states, opponents of
the seat belt defense may argue that courts should reject the
seat belt defense because the legislature has rejected a statute
requiring seat belt use. Courts should distinguish, however, be-
tween the rejection of a statute mandating seat belt use and the
rejection of the seat belt defense. It is possible to argue that
the state has no business requiring people to take steps for
their own safety-the legislature should not be paternalistic.
The argument does not, however, carry weight in the context of
the seat belt defense. It is one thing to argue that the state
should not require citizens to take reasonable steps to protect
themselves from injury. It is quite another to argue that if citi-
zens fail to take reasonable steps to protect themselves, they
should receive a full recovery from another for injuries re-
ceived as a result of such failure. In fact, the individualism at
the basis of the argument that the state should not interfere
with choices about personal safety also supports the position
that people should bear the consequences of their choices. Al-
lowing people to behave like fools if they choose to do so is con-
sistent with making them responsible for injuries caused by
their foolish behavior.
Consequently, a court should not reject the seat belt de-
fense on the assumption that the state's decision not to require
seat belt use is based on the belief that it is reasonable to fail to
wear a seat belt. The state may have decided not to require
seat belt use for quite different reasons.
E. ADMINISTRATIVE HEADACHES, TOUGH JURY ISSUES, AND
EXPERT BATTLES
It is possible to argue that jurisdictions should reject the
151. See supra text accompanying notes 103-07 (arguing seat belt defense is
consistent with common-law principles).
152. In Massachusetts and Nebraska, the legislatures mandated seat belt
use and the citizens overturned the legislation by referendum. See MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 7BB (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (providing subsequent his-
tory of statute); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 39-6,103.04 to 39-6,103.08 (1988) (providing
statute and subsequent history). Tennessee also has repealed its mandatory




seat belt defense because of its administrative headaches. 153 As
this Article will demonstrate in Part III, the operation of the
seat belt defense varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The
degree of administrative difficulty created will depend on the
version of the seat belt defense that a jurisdiction adopts.
In some jurisdictions, under the seat belt defense, the judge
merely tells the jury that it may consider the failure of the
plaintiff to wear a seat belt when determining damages.154
Such a seat belt defense does not create substantial administra-
tive problems, although it creates other problems that this Arti-
cle discusses in a later section. 155
In other jurisdictions that apply the seat belt defense, the
defendant must show what portion of the plaintiff's damages
would not have occurred had the plaintiff worn a seat belt.
This Article refers to these damages as exacerbation damages.
Under the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense,
the defendant is not responsible for the damages that would not
have occurred if the plaintiff had worn a seat belt. 56 To deter-
mine what damages would not have occurred had the plaintiff
worn a seat belt, the finder of fact must consider six factors:
(1) the particular crash behavior of the subject vehicle; (2) the tra-
jectory of the claimant's body in the accident; (3) the relationship of
the vehicle crash events to occupant kinematics; (4) the particular
injuries suffered; (5) the trajectory which a restrained occupant
would have taken; (6) the extent of lesser injuries which the re-
strained occupant would have sustained as a result of the impacts he
would have made with the vehicle.15 7
Obviously, evaluation of these factors in many cases will be
a difficult responsibility for a jury. The parties may use experts
to aid a jury in understanding a factual issue when the expert
has knowledge beyond that of the jury that will help the jury
153. One case rejected the seat belt defense solely on this ground. Jeep
Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 645-46, 708 P.2d 297, 301 (1985). Other cases
have included administrative difficulties as one of several reasons for rejecting
the defense. Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 506, 242 So. 2d 666, 673 (1970);
Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 495, 610 P.2d 668, 681
(1980); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 133, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977).
154. See infra note 164 (citing cases leaving seat belt issue to jury).
155. See infra text accompanying notes 210-20 (discussing dangers of al-
lowing jury discretion as to method of damage reduction under seat belt
defense).
156. See supra note 16 (citing cases adhering to no exacerbation-damge-re-
covery theory).
157. Bowman, Practical Defense Problems-The Trial Lawyer's View, 53
MARQ. L. REV. 191, 198 (1970). In some cases, the trier-of-fact may not be able
to determine which damages the plaintiff could have avoided by wearing a seat
belt. See infra text accompanying notes 158-59.
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to understand a matter at issue.158 A jury is likely to need ex-
pert testimony by a witness trained in accident reconstruction
before it can determine which damages the plaintiff could have
avoided by wearing a seat belt.159 A battle of experts is thus
highly likely. Defendants are likely to use experts who tend to
find that exacerbation damages are high. Plaintiffs are likely
to use experts who tend to find that exacerbation damages are
low.
Under the seat belt defense that this Article proposes, in
addition to determining what damages would not have occurred
had the plaintiff worn a seat belt, the trier-of-fact divides re-
sponsibility for those damages based on the relative fault of the
parties.160 The trier-of-fact must compare the fault of the par-
ties and assign a percentage of fault to each. The court then
reduces the plaintiff's recovery of exacerbation damages by the
percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, the question of which injuries the plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt caused and what percentage of fault
should be assigned to each party are like other problems with
which juries are confronted. In any case in which a plaintiff al-
leges that the defendant caused some damages and not others,
the jury must determine which of the plaintiff's damages the
defendant's negligence caused. Also, juries often confront bat-
tles of experts. The test for determining whether the jury
should be exposed to such a battle of experts should be, as in
other areas of the law, whether the expert has knowledge that
will help the trier-of-fact to determine a fact at issue.1 61 If so,
the trier-of-fact can consider the expert testimony. The respon-
sibility of the trier-of-fact to assign a percentage of fault to a
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt, as proposed in this Arti-
158. See Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F. Supp. 1561, 1565 (D.
Vt. 1985) (discussing need for expert testimony to establish seat belt defense);
Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147, 156, 755 P.2d 1135, 1144 (1988) (same);
Franklin v. Gibson, 138 Cal. App. 3d 340, 343, 188 Cal. Rptr. 23, 25 (1982)
(same); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 449-50, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d
916, 920 (1974) (same).
159. FED. R. EVID. 702 states:
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 267-75.
161. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 702, supra note 159.
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cle, is similar to the responsibility of the trier-of-fact to com-
pare the fault of the parties in all comparative fault cases.
The question whether the administrative complications of
the seat belt defense outweigh its fairness is similar to the issue
that many jurisdictions faced when they moved from contribu-
tory negligence to comparative negligence. Under the contribu-
tory negligence system, the trier-of-fact determined whether
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. No division of dam-
ages was required in the typical case. Obviously, an all-or-noth-
ing verdict under contributory negligence was easier to
administer than a verdict under comparative fault that requires
division of damages. Nevertheless, the vast majority of jurisdic-
tions rejected contributory negligence and adopted comparative
fault because of the greater fairness of comparative fault-it di-
vides responsibility for damage caused by the fault of both par-
ties based on their relative fault. The adoption of comparative
fault in the vast majority of jurisdictions illustrates the compel-
ling nature of its fairness.
162
Widespread practice with comparative negligence over sev-
eral years has demonstrated that a jury can handle the addi-
tional step of allocating fault to the parties. The additional
administrative burden of adopting the seat belt defense is not
substantially greater than that of going from a contributory
negligence rule to a comparative fault rule. It accomplishes the
same result-an allocation of responsibility for damages caused
by the negligence of the parties based on their relative fault.
Thus, administrative burdens should not prevent adoption of
the seat belt defense.
III. THE BASIS OF DAMAGE REDUCTION UNDER THE
SEAT BELT DEFENSE
Under the seat belt defense, there are four basic methods
of damage mitigation. Some courts adopt a no-exacerbation-
damage-recovery rule, under which the plaintiff is not allowed
to recover those damages that the plaintiff's failure to wear a
seat belt caused.1 63 A second group of courts allows the jury to
determine the weight to give to the plaintiff's failure to wear a
162. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
163. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984);
Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920-
21 (1974). For a discussion of the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt
defense, see infra text accompanying notes 167-88.
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seat belt.164 Statutes enacted in three states establish a third
method of dividing responsibility for damages under the seat
belt defense. Those statutes require front-seat occupants to
wear seat belts, allow admission of the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt in violation of the statute to mitigate damages,
but limit the mitigation of damages to from one to five percent
of the plaintiff's damages.165
This Article advocates a fourth method of apportioning
damages that takes into consideration both the extent to which
the plaintiff's injury was caused by failure to wear a seat belt
and the relative fault of the parties. Under this method, the de-
fendant is responsible for all damages the plaintiff would have
suffered had the plaintiff worn a seat belt. Responsibility for
those damages the plaintiff could have avoided by wearing a
seat belt is divided based on the relative fault of the parties. 66
A. THE No-EXACERBATION-DAMAGE-RECOVERY
SEAT BELT DEFENSE
New York' 67-- the first state explicitly to adopt the seat
belt defense-and Florida168 -one of the most recent states to
adopt the seat belt defense-have adopted the no-exacerbation-
damage-recovery version of the seat belt defense, under which
164. Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F. Supp. 1561, 1564 (D. Vt.
1985); Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Alaska 1986); Law v. Superior
Court, 157 Ariz. 147, 157, 755 P.2d 1135, 1145 (1988); Harlan v. Curbo, 250 Ark.
610, 612, 466 S.W.2d 459, 461 (1971) (by implication); Franklin v. Gibson, 138
Cal. App. 3d 340, 344, 188 Cal. Rptr. 23, 25 (1982); Cannon v. Lardner, 185 Ga.
App. 194, 197, 363 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1987); Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174,
179 (Ky. 1987); Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 462, 410 N.W.2d 706,
716 (1987); Dahl v. BMW, 304 Or. 558, 570, 748 P.2d 77, 84 (1987) (en banc).
Wisconsin phrases its method of dividing damages in such an ambiguous man-
ner that the trier-of-fact can apply any method of damage apportionment. Fo-
ley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 481-82, 335 N.W.2d 824, 827 (1983).
For a discussion of the jury discretion seat belt defenses, see infra text accom-
panying notes 189-220.
165. Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(2) (West Supp. 1988); Michigan,
MICH. Com ip. LAWS ANN. § 257.710e(3) (West Supp. 1988); Missouri, MO. ANN.
STAT. § 307.178(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988); cf. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 347.48(g) (West
Supp. 1988) (discussed infra at note 250). For a discussion of the mitigation
cap seat belt defense statutes, see infra text accompanying notes 221-45.
166. For a discussion of this seat belt defense, see infra text accompanying
notes 246-99. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Waterson v. General Motors
Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 544 A.2d 357 (1988), adopted a seat belt defense that is sim-
ilar to the method advocated herein. See infra notes 276, 278 and accompany-
ing text.
167. Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d
916, 921-23 (1974).
168. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984).
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plaintiffs may not recover any of the damages caused by their
negligent failure to wear a seat belt.169 The defendant must
show which portion of the damages the plaintiff would have
avoided by wearing a seat belt, referred to in this Article as ex-
acerbation damages. 170 Plaintiffs are allowed to recover only
damages they would have suffered had they worn seat belts.
17 1
1. Comparison with Contributory Negligence
Courts that adopt the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery
seat belt defense place responsibility for the exacerbation dam-
ages on the plaintiff on the theory that the defendant should
not be responsible for injuries caused by the plaintiff's negli-
gence. 172 That argument is, of course, the foundation of the
contributory negligence defense that precludes the plaintiff
from any recovery in accidents caused by the plaintiff's negli-
gence. 17 3 Like the contributory negligence defense, the no-ex-
acerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense places an unfair
responsibility on the plaintiff for all of the exacerbation dam-
ages. The no-exacerbation-damage-recovery rule is thus subject
to the same objection that commentators raise to the contribu-
tory negligence rule-that the rule unjustly places the loss
caused by both parties entirely on the injured plaintiff, who is
the least able to bear it.' 7 4
In addition, commentators criticize contributory negligence
because the slightest degree of culpability completely bars the
plaintiff's recovery. 175 The no-exacerbation-damage-recovery
169. Id.; Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363
N.Y.S.2d 916, 920-21 (1974).
170. Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d
916, 920-21 (1974).
171. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984);
Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920-
21 (1974).
172. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 453-54 (Fla.
1984); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 451, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916,
921 (1974).
173. See supra text accompanying note 107.
174. As Prosser said concerning the contributory negligence rule:
The attack upon contributory negligence has been founded upon the
obvious injustice of a rule which visits the entire loss caused by the
fault of two parties on one of them alone, and that one the injured
plaintiff, least able to bear it, and quite possibly much less at fault
than the defendant who goes scot free. No one ever has succeeded in
justifying that as a policy, and no one ever will.
Prosser, supra note 17, at 469.
175. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 468-69.
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seat belt defense is subject to the same criticism.176 The plain-
tiff is probably negligent for failing to wear a seat belt, but the
degree of culpability for failure to wear a seat belt is fairly
slight. Moreover, the plaintiff's negligence in failing to wear a
seat belt, unlike the plaintiff's negligence in many contributory
negligence cases, does not expose others to danger. Neverthe-
less, under the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery rule, even
though the plaintiff's negligence in failing to wear a seat belt is
slight, courts deny the plaintiff any recovery of the plaintiff's
exacerbation loss.
2. Jury Rejection
One reason that the vast majority of jurisdictions rejected
contributory negligence is the widely acknowledged fact that in
contributory negligence cases, juries often ignored the contribu-
tory negligence defense instructions. Rather than deny plain-
tiffs a recovery because of their negligence, juries allowed
recovery and diminished the plaintiffs' damages because of
their contributory negligence. 177 A similar phenomenon may
be occurring in some no-exacerbation-damage-recovery seat
belt defense cases. It appears that some juries consider it un-
fair to disallow recovery of any exacerbation damages, and at-
tempt to allow plaintiffs a recovery of a portion of those
damages despite the judge's instructions to the contrary.178
176. Under the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery rule, plaintiffs are enti-
tled to recover primary damages, which are damages they would have suffered
even if they had worn seat belts. In many cases, plaintiffs will have no recov-
ery because they would not have suffered any injury if they had worn seat
belts. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 172. Even when plaintiffs recover pri-
mary damages, it is unfair to refuse to allow any exacerbation damage recov-
ery. The plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt had nothing to do with the
primary damages. Allowing plaintiffs to recover primary damages does not
justify denying exacerbation damage recovery.
177. Prosser, supra note 17, at 469; see Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202
Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938) (stating: "We but blind our eyes to
obvious reality to the extent that we ignore the fact that in many cases juries
apply [apportionment] in spite of us.").
178. See, e.g., Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981);
Curry v. Moser, 89 A.D.2d 1, 454 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1982). In Caiazzo, all of the
plaintiffs' injuries were caused by their failure to wear seat belts. In spite of
the judge's instruction that the plaintiffs should receive no recovery for dam-
ages that they could have avoided by wearing seat belts, the jury reduced the
plaintiffs' damages by only 25%. 647 F.2d at 249. The appellate court reversed
the verdict because the jury failed to follow the judge's instructions. Id. at 252.
Curry is another no-exacerbation-damage-recovery case in which the jury
appears to have ignored the judge's instructions in order to divide responsibil-
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When juries believe a rule is unfair and ignore the instructions
of judges, courts should re-evaluate that rule.
ity for exacerbation damages. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York described the case as follows:
The jury determined that plaintiff had been damaged in the
amount of $50,000. The jury also found, in response to an interro-
gatory, that 100% of plaintiff's injuries were sustained as a result of
her failure to wear a seat belt. However, in mitigating the damage
award for plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt the jury reduced the
$50,000 award by only $15,000....
The jury's resolution of the damage issue is obviously inconsistent
and reflects an apparent misunderstanding of the trial court's
instructions.
89 A.D.2d at 4, 454 N.Y.S.2d, at 313.
A more likely explanation of the jury's action in Curry is given by Judge
Gibbons of the Appellate Division in another case. See DiMauro v. Metropoli-
tan Suburban Bus Auth., 105 A.D.2d 236, 483 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1984). Judge Gib-
bons states:
Juries, of course, have shown a certain disinclination to strictly apply
the Spier [no-exacerbation-damage-recovery] rule (See, e.g., Curry v.
Moser ... ), apparently sensing the injustice which can result from
the failure to apportion liability for the injuries caused by the so-
called "second collision" amongst its contributors, e.g., the unbelted
passenger and the various operators of the vehicles involved.
105 A.D.2d at 247, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 393, n.4.
Curry illustrates the inconsistency and unfairness of a state that applies
comparative negligence when the plaintiff's negligence is a cause of an acci-
dent, and applies the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense when
the plaintiff's negligence causes exacerbation of the plaintiff's injuries. In
Curry, the plaintiff fell out of the vehicle in which she was traveling when the
door next to her unexpectedly opened. 89 A.D.2d at 3, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
The vehicle following the plaintiff struck her. Id. The plaintiff brought suit
against the driver of the vehicle she occupied and the driver of the vehicle that
followed. Id& The defendants alleged that had the plaintiff worn a seat belt,
she would not have suffered any injury. Id at 4, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
Curry therefore is an unusual case because the failure to wear a seat belt
may have been a cause of the accident itself, rather than merely a cause of the
exacerbation of injuries. The Appellate Division reached the rather anoma-
lous conclusion that is required in a jurisdiction that recognizes both compara-
tive negligence and the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery rule. The court held
that, on remand, if the jury found that the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat
belt negligently caused her accident, the jury was to apportion the damages
based on comparative negligence. Id. at 8, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 316. If the jury
found that the failure to wear a seat belt was not a cause of the accident (pre-
sumably because the jury might conclude that the plaintiff would have suf-
fered some injuries even if she had worn a seat belt), and it found the failure
to wear a seat belt to be negligent, it was not to allow any recovery for those
damages that the plaintiff would have avoided by wearing a seat belt. Id. at 8-
9, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 316. The result is that the plaintiff is allowed a recovery for
what is likely to be a substantial portion of her damages if her failure to wear
a seat belt caused the entire accident. She is allowed only a minor recovery if
the jury determines that she suffered damages in addition to those suffered
due to her failure to wear a seat belt. Such a result is not only unfair and un-
reasonable, but it unjustifiably rewards clever pleading. If the defendant in
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3. Comparison with Comparative Fault
The no-exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense re-
sembles comparative fault in that under both defenses, plain-
tiffs are compensated for only a portion of their injury, but it
differs from comparative fault in one significant factor: the ba-
sis for reduction of the plaintiff's damages. The basis for reduc-
tion of damages under the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery
seat belt defense is solely causation-plaintiffs cannot recover
for those damages caused by their failure to wear a seat belt.
The basis for reduction of damages under comparative fault
cases is relative fault-the trier-of-fact compares the fault of
the plaintiff and defendant, assigns a percentage of fault to
each, and reduces the plaintiff's damages by the percentage of
fault allotted to the plaintiff.1 7 9
The inconsistency between comparative fault and the no-
exacerbation-damage-recovery defense becomes clear by com-
paring two cases. In one, a comparative fault case, the plaintiff
and the defendant each negligently cause a collision in which
the plaintiff is injured. The plaintiff is wearing a seat belt. In
the second case, a seat belt defense case, the defendant negli-
gently causes the collision and the plaintiff drives properly.
The plaintiff fails to wear a seat belt and, if the plaintiff had
worn a seat belt, the plaintiff would not have suffered any in-
jury. In a jurisdiction such as New York18 0 or Florida, 8 1 which
accepts the comparative fault defense and the no-exacerbation-
damage-recovery seat belt defense, a court would allow the
plaintiff to recover in the first case, although the percent of
fault attributed to the plaintiff's negligence would reduce that
recovery. In the second case, a court would not allow the plain-
tiff any recovery.
Curry drops his claim of comparative negligence based on the failure to wear a
seat belt, the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery rule goes into effect, and the
defendant may be able to prevent the plaintiff from receiving any recovery for
the injuries suffered as a result of the failure to wear a seat belt.
179. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 471-72. Some jurisdic-
tions apply a modified comparative fault rule, discussed infra note 267. Some
cases suggest that both fault and causation should be considered in assigning
responsibility for the loss. See cases cited infra note 191. This suggestion is
discussed at text infra accompanying notes 201-09.
180. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989) (adopt-
ing pure comparative negligence); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 449-50, 323
N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920 (1974) (adopting seat belt defense).
181. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973) (adopting pure com-
parative negligence); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 453
(Fla. 1984) (adopting seat belt defense).
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Culpability does not justify the difference in treatment of
the two plaintiffs. If anything, the plaintiff who fails to wear a
seat belt is likely to be less culpable than the plaintiff whose
negligence gives rise to the accident. The plaintiff in the seat
belt defense case exposed himself to a risk by failing to wear a
seat belt. The plaintiff in the comparative fault case exposed
others as well as himself to risk. The anomalous result is that
the relatively minor negligence of the plaintiff who failed to
wear a seat belt precludes any recovery, while what may be the
substantially more culpable conduct of the plaintiff who caused
the collision results in only a reduction of damages.
Causation does not justify the difference in treatment of
the plaintiff who negligently caused the collision and the plain-
tiff who negligently failed to wear a seat belt. In the compara-
tive fault case, the defendant's negligent driving and the
plaintiff's negligent driving caused the collision. In the seat
belt defense case, the defendant's negligent driving and the
plaintiff's negligent failure to wear a seat belt caused the plain-
tiff's injuries. In both cases, the negligence of the plaintiff, as
well as the negligence of the defendant, was a cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.
The foreseeability of the injury, from the perspective of
either plaintiff or of either defendant, does not justify the dif-
ference in treatment of the plaintiffs. The comparative fault
plaintiff should have foreseen that negligent driving might
cause injury.182 The plaintiff who failed to wear a seat belt
should have foreseen that failure to wear a seat belt might
cause injury. Each of the defendants should have foreseen that
negligent driving might cause a collision. The defendant in the
seat belt defense case might argue that courts should not re-
quire defendants to foresee plaintiffs' failure to wear seat belts,
but it is common knowledge that many people do not wear seat
belts.
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
noted the unfairness of requiring the plaintiff to bear the full
responsibility for exacerbation damages under the seat belt de-
fense. In DiMauro v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority,8 3
the plaintiff chose to sit in a front passenger's seat that did not
have a properly functioning seat belt, rather than sit in a va-
182. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 454
(Fla. 1984); Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Alaska 1986); Lowe v.
Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 460, 410 N.W.2d 706, 715 (1987).
183. 105 A.D.2d 236, 483 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1984).
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cant back seat where there was a properly functioning seat
belt. 8 4 The court held that a jury could find the plaintiff's
choice to sit in the front passenger's seat to be negligent, just as
a jury can find the failure to use a seat belt to be negligent. 185
The court further held that if, on remand, the jury determined
that the failure of the plaintiff to sit in the seat with a properly
functioning seat belt was negligent, the plaintiff would not be
able to recover for those injuries the plaintiff could have
avoided by taking proper precautions. 8 6 The court went on to
express reluctance to follow a rule that required imposing the
total loss for exacerbation damages on the unbelted plaintiff
and that might result in the plaintiff recovering nothing for in-
juries even though the defendant's negligence caused the acci-
dent. The court stated, however, that it was bound by
precedent to do so. 187
At the time that New York adopted the no-exacerbation-
damage-recovery seat belt defense, it was operating under a sys-
tem of contributory negligence. When the New York courts ex-
amine the seat belt defense under comparative fault principles,
they may adopt a new seat belt defense. If the courts do apply
comparative fault principles to the seat belt defense, they
should require the jury to determine, as it does under the no-
exacerbation-damage-recovery rule, which damages would not
have occurred had the plaintiff worn a seat belt, and then to al-
locate responsibility for those damages on comparative fault
principles, as this Article advocates in Part IV(D).18 8
184. Id at 238, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87.
185. Id at 244, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
186. Id. at 246-47, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 392-99.
187. The court stated:
In ruling as we do, we express some reluctance in following the
mechanical rule set forth in Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 363
N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164, which effectively imposes 100% liability
upon an unbelted plaintiff for injuries sustained as a result of his or
her failure to wear a seat belt, notwithstanding the fact that he or she
may have been blameless in causing the accident in the first instance.
Thus, in the case, of an unbelted passenger who is sitting in a vehicle
which is lawfully stopped at a traffic signal, it is theoretically possible
to recover nothing even though the vehicle was struck in the rear by
a speeding, intoxicated driver.... However, the presence of Spier as a
controlling precedent precludes us from adopting [a rule that would
apportion liability for the injuries caused by the so-called "second col-
lision"] in this case.
Id. at 247, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 393 n.4.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 246-99.
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B. THE JURY DISCRETION SEAT BELT DEFENSES
Some courts appear to give juries great discretion in deter-
mining what effect the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt is
to have. In some of these jurisdictions, the courts simply do not
specify the basis for damage reduction. 8 9 Other jurisdictions
phrase the damage reduction method in such an ambiguous
manner that juries can apply almost any method of damage
apportionment.190
Such jurisdictions may give the jury discretion to deter-
mine the method of damage apportionment because the lan-
guage of their comparative fault cases indicates that the jury is
to compare causation as well as fault when determining the
percentages of fault of the parties.' 9' In seat belt defense cases,
courts may interpret such language to mean that in apportion-
ing responsibility for damages, the jury determines what weight
to give to the fact that plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt
caused a portion of the plaintiff's loss and what weight to give
to the plaintiff's relative fault. A careful examination of these
comparative fault cases, however, indicates that cause-in-fact
questions, such as which damages the plaintiff's failure to wear
a seat belt caused, should not affect the responsibility assigned
to each of the parties under comparative fault. 92 The trier-of-
fact should first resolve the cause-in-fact question and then,
concerning damages caused by the negligence of both of the
parties, should compare fault.
If a jury has discretion about how the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt is to affect recovery, the jury may deny the
plaintiff any recovery of exacerbation damages, it may reduce
all of the plaintiff's damages based on relative fault, it may re-
duce the plaintiff's exacerbation damage recovery based on rel-
ative fault, or it may divide the damages on some other basis.
Verdicts will be inconsistent, and in some cases juries will not
189. See supra note 164. The failure of such cases to state explicitly how
responsibility for damages is to be allocated may indicate an uneasiness with
the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense. The problems with
the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery rule are discussed supra at text accom-
panying notes 167-88.
190. See supra note 164.
191. See, e.g., Cannon v. Lardner, 185 Ga. App. 194, -, 363 S.E.2d 574, 576-
77 (1987), vacated in part, aff'd in part, 258 Ga. 332, -, 368 S.E.2d 730, 732
(1988); Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Ky. 1987); Lowe v. Estate Mo-
tors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 462, 410 N.W.2d 706, 716 (1987); Dahl v. BMW, 304 Or.
558, 568-69, 748 P.2d 77, 83 (1987) (en banc); see also Smith v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 600 F. Supp. 1561, 1564 (D. Vt. 1985).
192. See infra text accompanying notes 201-09.
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divide responsibility for damages caused by both of the parties
based on the parties' relative fault.1 93
This section will discuss those jurisdictions that appear to
give the jury discretion as to the effect the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt is to have. The section analyzes the compara-
tive fault language that might arguably permit the jury to
weigh cause-in-fact, as well as fault, in assigning percentages of
fault, and the problems that arise if courts give juries such
discretion.
1. The Failure to Wear a Seat Belt as a Relevant Factor for
Jury Consideration under Comparative Fault
Some courts have held that the jury may consider the
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt in assessing damage under
comparative fault, but have not stated how the jury is to calcu-
late damage reduction.19 4 The Alaska Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, has said: "the concept of comparative negligence
contemplates the inclusion of all relevant factors in arriving at
the appropriate damage award and non-use of a seat belt is a
relevant factor for apportioning damages.' 95 If a court merely
instructs a jury that the failure of the plaintiff to wear a seat
belt is a relevant factor for apportioning damages under com-
parative negligence, the jury must determine on what basis to
reduce plaintiff's recovery. The jury must determine what
weight, if any, to give to the fact that the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt caused only a portion of the damages and what
weight to give to the fact that the plaintiff and the defendant
may have differing levels of culpability.
Courts that do not specify how the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt is to affect his recovery may not intend that
the jury be given such discretion. Rather, they may not yet
have faced the issue of how to divide responsibility.
2. Jury Discretion Through Instruction Ambiguity
A 1983 Wisconsin case adopted such an incomprehensible
statement explaining reduction of a plaintiff's damages that ju-
193. See infra text accompanying notes 210-20.
194. See supra note 164.
195. Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Alaska 1986); see also Can-
non v. Lardner, 185 Ga. App. 194, -, 363 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1987) (citing appel-
lant's failure to use seat belt as likely to have contributed to severity of
injuries, so court correctly allowed jury to consider that failure in determining
damage award under theory of comparative negligence).
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ries appeared to have great discretion as to the basis to use in
reducing a plaintiff's recovery. 196 The Wisconsin court said:
[A] fair and administrable procedure, taking into account the public
policy underlying the seat-belt defense and the principles of compara-
tive negligence... is to calculate a plaintiff's provable damages by the
usual rules of negligence without regard to the seat-belt defense and
then take into account the seat-belt defense by decreasing the recover-
able damages by the percentage of the plaintiff's causal seat-belt
negligence.1
97
This statement raises the question of how a jury is to determine
"the percentage of the plaintiff's causal seat-belt negligence."
The percentage assigned to the plaintiff could be based on the
amount of damages caused by failure to wear a seat belt, on the
relative culpability of the plaintiff compared with the defend-
ant, or on some combination of the two. A reading of the full
Wisconsin opinion does not answer the question. Some portions
of the opinion suggest that plaintiffs receive no recovery for
those damages they could have avoided by wearing seat belts.198
Other portions of the opinion, however, suggest that the reduc-
tion of recovery is based on a comparison of fault.1 99
In holding that the jury is to determine the percentage that
plaintiff's damages are to be reduced based on "plaintiff's
causal seat-belt negligence," the court, in effect, left it to the
jury to determine the weight to give to the fact that the plain-
tiff's failure to wear a seat belt caused a portion of the plain-
196. Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
197. Id. at 486-87, 335 N.W.2d at 829 (emphasis added).
198. We should seek to treat the plaintiff and defendant in such a way
that the plaintiff recovers damages from the defendant for the inju-
ries that the defendant caused, but that the defendant is not held lia-
ble for incremental injuries the plaintiff could and should have
prevented by wearing an available seat belt.
Id. at 489, 335 N.W.2d at 830-31.
The Wisconsin court also suggested that its seat belt rule "borrows from
the apportionment technique used in two traditional tort doctrines: avoidable
consequences and mitigation of damages." Id. at 487, 335 N.W.2d at 830.
Under those doctrines, plaintiffs are allowed no recovery for damages that
they could have avoided by exercising reasonable care after the initial injury.
That principle appears to suggest the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery rule.
199. The Wisconsin court suggested that its seat belt defense was based on
comparative negligence principles. Id. at 485-88, 335 N.W.2d at 829, 830. The
court said: "The comparative negligence rule is designed to reduce a plaintiff's
damage in proportion to plaintiff's fault." Id. at 487-88, 335 N.W.2d at 830.
The New Jersey Superior Court adopted the Wisconsin method of dafiage
apportionment in Dunn v. Durso, 219 N.J. Super. 383, 401, 530 A.2d 387, 397
(1986). The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this method, however, in




tiff's injuries. The Wisconsin Legislature recently adopted a
new seat belt defense that is similar to the seat belt defense ad-
vocated in this Article.200
3. Comparison of Causation and Fault
The language in some comparative fault cases and statutes
appears to justify a jury's comparison of both fault and causa-
tion. Some use the term comparative causation rather than
comparative fault.20 1 Others suggest that when the jury com-
pares the fault of the plaintiff with the fault of the defendant,
it is to compare both fault and causation.20 2 For example, sec-
tion 2(b) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act ("UCFA")
states: "In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of
fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party
at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the con-
duct and the damages claimed. '20 3
An examination of the cases that use the term comparative
causation and the cases and statutes that suggest the jury is to
consider fault and causation in assigning percentages of fault,
however, reveals that they do not intend to allow the jury to
determine what role cause-in-fact is to play. The jury must de-
termine that the plaintiff's negligence was a cause-in-fact of the
injury before the jury can compare the fault of the parties.
Those jurisdictions that use the term comparative causa-
tion do so to emphasize that the fault the jury is to compare is
the fault which caused the injury. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, has said: "perhaps
the term 'comparative causation' is a conceptually more precise
term than 'comparative fault' since fault alone without causa-
tion does not subject one to liability. '20 4
200. 200 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48(g) (West Supp. 1988). The new Wiscon-
sin seat belt statute, like the proposal advocated in this Article, reduces only
that portion of the plaintiff's damages that the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat
belt caused. Id The Wisconsin statute, however, limits the reduction to 15%
of the plaintiff's exacerbation damages. Id. For a discussion of the statute, see
infra note 250.
201. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598,
602 (D. Idaho 1976); cf Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc., v. Marine Constr. & Design
Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 1977) (first examining contributory negli-
gence in causation, then comparing fault).
202. See, e.g., UNIF. COnMPARATIvE FAULT AcT § 2(B), 12 U.L.A. 45 (Supp.
1989) [hereinafter U.C.F.A.].
203. I&
204. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, 565 F.2d at 1139 (citation omitted). The term
comparative causation is confusing and is not conceptually more precise than
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Under the UCFA, courts may reduce the plaintiff's recov-
ery only for "an injury attributable to the claimant's contribu-
tory fault. '205  According to the UCFA comments, the
claimant's fault must have caused the claimant's damage under
the rules of both cause-in-fact and proximate cause in order for
it to reduce the claimant's recovery.206 What then is the mean-
ing of the statement in section 2 of the UCFA that "[i]n deter-
mining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider
both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the
extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the dam-
ages claimed"? 20 7 The comment to Section 2 suggests that the
aspect of causal relation the jury is to consider in determining
percentage of fault is the "relative closeness" of the parties'
negligence and the injury.208
Thus, by saying that the finder-of-fact may consider fault
and causation, neither the courts nor the UCFA are suggesting
that the jury can determine the role which cause-in-fact is to
play in reduction of damages. Rather, the finder-of-fact may
consider causation in the sense of proximate cause, the foresee-
ability of the harm in assessing culpability. The finder-of-fact
should determine what harm both the negligence of the plain-
tiff and the negligence of the defendant caused and should di-
vide responsibility for the harm caused by both of them based
on a comparison of fault.
20 9
the term comparative fault. There is no reason for the label given to the de-
fense to convey the concept that the trier-of-fact is to compare only the negli-
gence causing the harm. It is well-established that the the defendant must
show that the plaintiff's negligence caused the harm before courts will apply
either contributory negligence or comparative negligence.
205. U.C.F.A. § 1(a), supra note 202, at 41.
206. The comment states:
Causation. For the conduct stigmatized as fault to have any ef-
fect under the provisions of this Act it must have had an adequate
causal relation to the claimant's damage. This includes the rules of
both cause in fact and proximate cause.
"Injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault" refers to
the requirement of a causal relation for the particular damage.
Id. comment to § 1, at 42.
207. Id. § 2(b), at 45.
208. The comment to section 2 states:
In determining the relative fault of the parties, the fact-finder
will also give consideration to the relative closeness of the causal rela-
tionship of the negligent conduct of the defendants and the harm to
the plaintiff. Degrees of fault and proximity of causation are inextri-
cably mixed ....
Id. comment to § 2, at 46.
209. See infra text accompanying notes 246-99.
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4. Dangers of the Jury Discretion Seat Belt Defenses
This Article has discussed some cases that appear to give
juries discretion to determine the roles that cause-in-fact and
relative fault are to play in the seat belt defense. At least one
commentator has looked favorably on this approach.2 1 0
If courts allow juries to consider the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt, without instructions as to the role that causa-
tion and comparative fault are to play, however, two dangers
emerge. Lack of judicial guidance could produce inconsistent
results and some juries will give inappropriate consideration to
the roles of cause-in-fact and comparative fault. If courts do
not instruct juries as to the role that causation and comparative
fault are to play in the seat belt defense, juries may apply any
one of several methods of damage reduction. Juries might:
210. Twerski has commented favorably on the idea of leaving to the jury
the determination of what effect the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt
should have on damages. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative
Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297,
326 (1977). He says in discussing a case that adopted the seat belt defense but
failed to specify the basis on which the plaintiff's damages were to be reduced:
[T]he Wisconsin court did not see fit to bifurcate the first collision
damages and the second collision damages which resulted from the
failure to wear the seat belt and opted instead for a general homespun
evaluation of fault for the entire injury.... [I]n a common sense way
the court dealt intelligently with what is a most complex problem.
The court took the position that plaintiffs should bear responsibility
for some safety and that it would leave to the good sense of the jury
just how to evaluate plaintiff's share in the overall injury setting...
[The court opted not for a comparison of the negligence but rather
for a reduction of plaintiff's verdict based on a visceral assessment of
the role that plaintiff played in the injury.
MdL at 328-29 (footnote omitted) (discussing Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362,
149 N.W.2d 626 (1967), one of the early cases to recognize the seat belt de-
fense).
The Bentzler court held that application of the seat belt defense under the
evidence presented at trial would have been improper because the defendant
failed to introduce sufficient evidence for the jury to determine whether the
failure to wear a seat belt contributed to the injuries. Bentzler, 34 Wis. 2d at
387, 149 N.W.2d at 640. In Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335
N.W.2d 824 (1983), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that under the seat belt
defense, the jury is to reduce the plaintiff's damages by "the percentage of the
plaintiff's causal seatbelt negligence." 113 Wis. 2d at 486-87, 335 N.W.2d at 829
(footnote omitted). See supra text accompanying note 197.
Twerski acknowledges that "[i]f we are to seek analytical purity," we will
adopt either the no-exacerbation-damage-recovery rule or reduce the plain-
tiff's recovery of exacerbation damages based on relative fault, as this Article
advocates. Twerski, supra, at 327-28. He argues, however, that it would be
impossible to compare the negligence of the plaintiff in failing to wear a seat
belt with the negligence of the defendant which caused the collision. That ar-
gument is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 268-75.
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(1) Deny plaintiffs any recovery for damages that
they could have avoided by wearing a seat belt;2 1'
(2) Reduce the total damages of plaintiffs based on
their relative fault;2 1 2 or
(3) Reduce the recovery of damages that plaintiffs
could have avoided by wearing a seat belt based on
their relative fault.2 1 3
A hypothetical illustrates the variety of verdicts that dif-
ferent juries might render, based on the same factual conclu-
sions under a jury discretion seat belt defense. Assume a case
in which a defendant, negligently driving five miles per hour
over the speed limit, causes a collision with a plaintiff who is
not wearing a seat belt. The plaintiff's total damages are
$100,000. The defendant presents credible evidence that if the
plaintiff had worn a seat belt, the plaintiff's damages would
have been $30,000. The court either instructs the jury that it is
merely to reduce the plaintiff's damages based on failure to
wear a seat belt2 14 or that it is to reduce the plaintiff's damages
based on "causal seat belt negligence." 215 The three approaches
listed above produce different results:
(1) The jury might conclude that the plaintiff should
receive no recovery for damages that the plaintiff
could have avoided by wearing a seat belt, and award
the plaintiff $30,000 [$100,000 - $70,000].
(2) The jury might compare the negligence of the
plaintiff in failing to wear a seat belt with the negli-
gence of the defendant in driving five miles an hour
over a safe speed, conclude that the degree of fault is
approximately equal, and award the plaintiff $50,000
[$100,000 - $50,000].
(3) The jury might reduce those damages caused by
the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt [$70,000] by
the relative culpability of the plaintiff [50%] and award
the plaintiff damages of $65,000 [$100,000-$35,000].
In all three cases, the jury reached the same factual conclu-
211. This Article refers to this method of damage reduction as the no-exac-
erbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense. See supra text accompanying
notes 167-88.
212. This method of damage reduction is discussed infra text accompany-
ing notes 256-62.
213. This method of damage reduction is advocated by this Article. It is
discussed infra text accompanying notes 244-99.
214. See, e.g., supra note 164.
215. See, e.g., supra note 165.
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sions: total damages are $100,000; exacerbation damages are
$70,000; and relative fault is fifty percent each. The damage
award in each case, however, was substantially different.2 16
Parties should not be subject to such widely divergent verdicts
based on the same factual determinations.
The hypothetical illustrates two different risks. A jury dis-
cretion rule is likely to produce inconsistent results. Further,
some juries will not give appropriate weight to causation and
comparative fault. The first jury above applied a no-exacerba-
tion-damage-recovery rule, which fails to consider the relative
fault of the parties.2 1 7 The jury in the second example failed to
give appropriate weight to the role of causation, by reducing all
of the plaintiff's damages based on the plaintiff's fault in fail-
ing to wear a seat belt.21 8 As this Article will demonstrate,219
the seat belt defense should not reduce the plaintiff's recovery
of damages that failure to wear a seat belt did not cause. The
third jury applied the proper rule. It determined which dam-
ages the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt caused, and re-
duced those damages based on the plaintiff's relative fault.220
C. THE STATUTORY MITIGATION CAP SEAT BELT DEFENSES
In the last few years, the legislatures in twenty-nine states
have passed statutes requiring seat belt use.221 Three of those
states allow the seat belt defense when the plaintiff violates the
statute, but limit the reduction of damages to a small percent of
the plaintiff's total damages-one percent in Missouri and five
percent in Iowa and Michigan. 222 These statutes may lead to in-
consistent treatment of front and back seat occupants. The
statutes require only front seat occupants to wear seat belts,
216. In the language of the Wisconsin rule, the jury determined the plain-
tiff's "causal seatbelt negligence" in each case to be substantially different
(30%, 50%, 65%). See supra note 197.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 167-88.
218. Such a seat belt defense is discussed infra text accompanying notes
256-62.
219. See infra text accompanying notes 256-62.
220. See infra text accompanying notes 246-99.
221. See supra note 31.
222. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445 4(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP.
LAWs ANN. § 257.710e(5) (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.178(3) sec.
(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989); cf Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48(g) (West Supp. 1988)
(placing a 15% cap on reduction of plaintiff's recovery of exacerbation dam-
ages). The Wisconsin statute is similar to the proposal in this Article in that,
unlike other mitigation cap statutes, it permits reduction of only the exacerba-




and the mitigation cap applies only to violations of the stat-
ute.223 If the courts of these states adopt the seat belt defense,
the states may have the anomalous result of limiting the reduc-
tion of a front seat occupant's damages for failure to wear a
seat belt to one to five percent of his damages, while placing no
limit on the reduction of the back seat occupant's damages.
The Michigan Supreme Court has indicated that this result is
possible.22 4 An additional question is whether the limitation on
reduction of damages applies whenever the plaintiff's failure to
use a seat belt is a violation of the statute, or applies only when
the defendant attempts to use the statute to establish the plain-
tiff's negligent failure to use a seat belt.
225
This section will analyze three issues. The first subsection
examines the mitigation cap statutes under the principles of
comparative fault. The second subsection explores the possibil-
ity that front and back seat occupants will be treated differ-
ently under the mitigation cap statutes. The final subsection
evaluates whether the mitigation cap should apply if the de-
fendant does not use the statute to establish that the plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt constitutes negligence.
1. Consistency with Comparative Fault
A provision limiting the reduction of damages under the
seat belt defense undercuts the principle of comparative fault
that responsibility for damages caused by the negligence of
both parties should reflect the relative culpability of the par-
ties. A low mitigation cap ignores the role that both causation
and culpability should play in damage assessment.
The proportion of the damages caused by the plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt will vary substantially from case to
case. In some cases, the failure to wear a seat belt will cause
very little damage. In others, the failure to wear a seat belt
will cause all of the plaintiff's damages.
The plaintiff's relative culpability for failure to wear a seat
belt will also vary substantially depending on the relative ex-
tent of the defendant's and the plaintiff's culpability. The rela-
tive culpability of a plaintiff who fails to wear a seat belt is
223. See infra note 228.
224. The Michigan court has suggested that such an anomaly is a possibility
but that it is "a legislative concern." Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich.
439, 469, 410 N.W.2d 706, 718-19 (1987). For a discussion of this problem, see
infra text accompanying notes 228-45.
225. See infra text accompanying notes 237-45.
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much greater when compared with a defendant who drives five
miles-per-hour over the limit than when compared with a de-
fendant who exceeds the limit by thirty-five miles-per-hour. A
plaintiff who fails to buckle a seat belt in the front seat before
traveling on an icy, crowded highway is probably more culpable
than one who fails to buckle up in the back seat prior to a short
drive in a suburban neighborhood under good driving condi-
tions. The amount of damage reduction should vary if the
plaintiff's recovery is to reflect the relative fault of the parties
in causing the damages suffered due to the failure to wear a
seat belt.
The rule that courts formerly applied in admiralty was
similar in some respects to a seat belt defense mitigation cap.
Under the old admiralty comparative negligence rule, when
both the plaintiff and the defendant negligently caused the
plaintiff's damages, the courts reduced the plaintiff's recovery
by half.226 The finder of fact was not required to weigh relative
culpability. Courts rejected this rule because the relative culpa-
bility of the parties varies substantially from case to case.227
Courts now reduce the recovery of admirality plaintiffs by the
percentage of fault attributed to them. Seat belt statutes that
place a cap on damage reduction raise this same issue, because
the damage award may not reflect the relative culpability of
the parties.
2. Inconsistent Treatment of Front and Back Seat Occupants
The mandatory use statutes that include a mitigation cap
require only the front seat occupants to use seat belts,228 and
the mitigation cap applies only to plaintiffs who are in violation
of the statute.229 Unless the courts of these jurisdictions adopt
the same mitigation cap for seat belt defense cases involving
226. T. SCHOENBAUmi, A mIRALTY & MARITIME LAW § 13-3, at 456, 456n.1
(1987) (noting that this rule was established in The Schooner Catherine v.
Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177-78 (1855), and survived until 1975).
227. Id § 13-3, at 456. See also United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421
U.S. 397, 411 (1975) (overruling The Schooner Catherine and establishing a new
rule which allocates liability for damages based on comparative degree of
fault).
228. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(2). (West Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWs
ANN. § 257.710(e)(3) (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.178(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1989).
229. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(4)(b) (West Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP.




back seat occupants, those state courts will apply inconsistent
seat belt defenses to front and back seat occupants.
If the courts of a state with a mitigation cap reject the seat
belt defense for back seat occupants, the difference in treat-
ment will be consistent with the underlying theory of the legis-
lation. The danger of injury in a collision for one not wearing a
seat belt is much greater for front seat occupants than for back
seat occupants. 230 The failure of the front seat occupant to use
a seat belt therefore shows greater culpability. Consequently, it
is possible to justify a reduction of the front seat occupant's re-
covery, but not the back seat occupant's recovery, based on rel-
ative carelessness.
The courts of those states with a mitigation cap will create
a great, unjustified inconsistency, however, if they apply the
seat belt defense in cases involving back seat occupants. The
finder-of-fact could reduce the recoveries of front seat occu-
pants by only a small amount under the statute, but could re-
duce the recoveries of back seat occupants substantially. Not
only would such an approach treat the front and back seat oc-
cupants differently, but it would allow the more negligent of
the two, the front seat occupant, the greater recovery.
The Michigan Supreme Court discussed this issue recently
in Lowe v. Estate Motor Ltd.231 Lowe involved a collision that
occurred prior to the adoption of Michigan's five percent miti-
gation cap statute, but the court reached its decision after the
enactment of the statute.232 The plaintiff was a back seat pas-
senger who failed to wear a seat belt.233 The court adopted the
seat belt defense, holding that the plaintiff's failure to wear a
seat belt should be treated similarly to other forms of compara-
tive negligence. 234 The court recognized that its decision could
result in the anomalous result of protecting the recoveries of
front seat occupants under the statute while not protecting the
recoveries of the arguably less culpable back seat occupants,
but the court stated that the problem was an issue for the
legislature.235
230. See, e.g., supra note 55 and studies cited therein.
231. 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706 (1987).
232. Id. at 463, 410 N.W.2d at 716.
233. Id. at 446, 410 N.W.2d at 708.
234. Id. at 462, 410 N.W.2d at 715-16.
235. The court stated:
While we are cognizant of the potential argument that the effect of
the five-percent limitation could lead, potentially and perhaps anoma-
lously, to the irrational result of protecting the recoveries of individu-
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Some courts may decide, in the name of consistency and
out of deference to the legislatures, to apply the same statutory
cap to back seat occupants that the statutes require for front
seat occupants. The Michigan Supreme Court, however, indi-
cated that it would not be inclined to apply the mitigation cap
to back seat passengers because "the judiciary has traditionally
not involved itself in the setting of arbitrary figures or
percentages. '236
3. Applicability of the Mitigation Cap if Statute Not Used to
Establish Negligence
It is unclear under the statutes that place a cap on damage
reduction whether or not the cap applies if the defendant does
not use the statute to establish the plaintiff's negligence. The
Michigan statute, for example, states:
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may be consid-
ered evidence of negligence and may reduce the recovery for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor ve-
hicle. However, such negligence shall not reduce the recovery for
damages by more than 5%.237
Does "such negligence" refer to the negligence defendants es-
tablish using the statute, or to all negligence that is a violation
of the statute? The Iowa and Missouri statutes create a similar
ambiguity.
2 38
als whose failure to use seat belts was in violation of the statute, while
not protecting the recoveries of those whose failure to use seat belts
was not in violation of it, we are compelled to conclude that that ef-
fect is essentially a legislative concern.
428 Mich. at 469, 410 N.W.2d, at 718-19.
236. Id. at 468, 410 N.W.2d at 718. The court said:
The question of specific percentage limitations is not now before the
Court. Furthermore, unlike the Legislature, the judiciary has tradi-
tionally not involved itself in the setting of arbitrary figures or per-
centages. Thus, when faced with the question whether, because of the
five-percent limitation, we should affirm, as a matter of common law,
an erroneous and unsupportable exception to the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence, we are compelled to answer in the negative.
428 Mich. at 468-69, 410 N.W.2d at 817 (emphasis added).
237. MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.710e(h)(5) (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis
added).
238. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(4)(b) (West Supp. 1988); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 307.178(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989). The Iowa statute states:
[T]he failure to wear a safety belt or safety harness in violation of
this section may be admitted to mitigate damages, but only under the
following circumstances: (1) Parties seeking to introduce evidence of
the failure to wear a safety belt or safety harness in violation of this
section must first introduce substantial evidence that the failure to
wear a safety belt or safety harness contributed to the injury or inju-
ries claimed by the plaintiff.
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Under each of the statutes, the mitigation cap clearly ap-
plies when the defendant uses the violation of the statute to
mitigate damages. The difficult issue is whether the cap applies
if the defendant argues only that the plaintiff's failure to wear
a seat belt is a violation of the common-law requirement that
people exercise reasonable care for their own safety.
239
In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, it is rea-
sonable to read these statutes as placing a cap on the mitigation
of the plaintiff's recovery only in those cases in which the de-
fendant uses the statute to establish that the plaintiff's failure
to use a seat belt is a failure to exercise reasonable care. If
courts interpret the mitigation cap to apply only when the stat-
ute is used to establish that the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat
belt is negligent, defendants have the option of using the stat-
ute and accepting the limit on damage mitigation. Defendants
can avoid the mitigation cap, but they must persuade the court
to adopt the seat belt defense without the aid of the statute and
must convince the trier-of-fact that the failure to wear a seat
belt is negligent. 240
Under such an interpretation of the mitigation cap statutes,
there is no great inconsistency with comparative fault 241 be-
cause defendants have the option of subjecting themselves to
the limit of the mitigation cap. This interpretation also mini-
mizes the discrepancy between treatment of front and back seat
plaintiffs.242 Front seat plaintiffs will benefit from the limita-
(2) If the evidence supports such a finding, the trier offact... may
reduce the amount of plaintiff's recovery by an amount not to exceed
five percent of the damages awarded after any reductions for compar-
ative fault.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(4)(b) (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis added); see also
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.178(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (allowing reduction by
amount not to exceed one percent of the damages awarded after any compara-
tive negligence reductions). Is the limitation on the mitigation of damages
merely one of the "circumstances" under which the violation of the statute
can be admitted to mitigate damages, or is a limitation to be applied whenever
the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt is a violation of the statute?
239. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 193-208 (discuss-
ing application of reasonable conduct standard).
240. Under the Iowa and Missouri statutes, evidence of the plaintiff's fail-
ure to wear a seat belt in violation of the statute may not be used as evidence
of comparative negligence. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(4)(b) (West Supp. 1988);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.178(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989). The statutes, however, do
not state whether courts may admit the failure to wear a seat belt, without a
showing that it is in violation of the statute, as evidence of comparative
negligence.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 221-27.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 228-36.
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tion of the mitigation cap only if defendants attempt to use the
statute to establish negligence. If defendants do not use the
statute, front and back seat plaintiffs will be on equal footing
when defendants attempt to persuade a court to adopt the seat
belt defense or attempt to convince a judge or jury that failure
to wear a seat belt is negligent. If courts interpret the mitiga-
tion cap as applying to all violations of the statute, however,
then a state may be left with what the Michigan Supreme
Court has called the "irrational result of protecting the recov-
eries of individuals whose failure to use seat belts was in viola-
tion of the statute, while not protecting the recoveries of those
whose failure to use seat belts was not in violation of it.. .-243
When a statute is susceptible of two meanings, one of
which would lead to inconsistent results, courts should adopt
the more reasonable meaning.244 The potential inconsistency in
treatment of front and back seat occupants is obvious. It is rea-
sonable to conclude that the legislatures intended to give the
defendant the right to use the statute to establish that the
plaintiff is negligent, but that if the defendant does so, the
court will reduce the plaintiff's damages by only a small
amount.
2 4 5
243. Lowe, 428 Mich. at 469, 410 N.W.2d at 718-19.
244. See supra text accompanying note 147.
245. Justice Levin of the Michigan Supreme Court, dissenting in Lowe, sug-
gested another interpretation of the mitigation cap statutes. In his opinion,
the Michigan statute, which appears supra in text accompanying note 237:
codified the common-law rule, established by the Court of Appeals,
that damages may not be reduced for failure to wear a seat belt with a
"narrow exception" permitting reduction of a damage award by not
more than five percent for failure of a front-seat occupant to wear a
seat belt.
428 Mich. at 492, 410 N.W.2d at 729 (Levin, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
Justice Levin's statement that the common law rejects the seat belt de-
fense is based on two Michigan Court of Appeals decisions, Schmitzer v. Mis-
ener-Bennett, 135 Mich. App. 350, 359-60, 354 N.W.2d 336, 340 (1984) (holding
evidence demonstrating plaintiff's failure to wear seat belt inadmissible under
Michigan's system of comparative negligence), and Romankewiz v. Black, 16
Mich. App. 119, 127, 167 N.W.2d 606, 610-11 (1969) (finding failure to use seat
belt not appropriate under doctrine of avoidable consequences). Lowe, 428
Mich. at 490-91, 410 N.W.2d at 728 (Levin, J., dissenting). If the legislature
codified the rejection of the seat belt defense, except for the front seat passen-
ger mitigation cap seat belt defense, as Justice Levin suggests, the mitigation
cap statute would not create the danger of unjustified inconsistent treatment
of front and back seat occupants suggested above. Courts could mitigate the
recoveries of front seat occupants by up to five percent, but could not mitigate
the recoveries of the less culpable rear seat occupants at all.
Justice Levin's argument that the legislature "codified the common-law
rule," 428 Mich. at 492, 410 N.W.2d at 729, however, is questionable. The stat-
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D. A PROPOSAL: THE COMPARATIVE FAULT REDUCTION OF
EXACERBATION DAMAGES
Rejection of the seat belt defense is unfair because it im-
poses on the defendant full responsibility for injuries caused by
the plaintiff's negligent failure to wear a seat belt.246 The no-
exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense is also unfair,
because it denies the plaintiff any recovery for exacerbation
damages, which were caused by the defendant's negligence as
well as by the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt.247 Jurisdic-
tions that leave to jury discretion the effect that the plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt defense is to have on recovery will
have inconsistent results, some of which will give inappropriate
consideration to the question of what portion of the damages
the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt caused and to the ques-
tion of the relative fault of the parties. 248 Seat belt defense mit-
igation cap statutes do not allow juries to divide responsibility
for damages caused by both of the parties based on their rela-
tive culpability, and may treat front and back seat plaintiffs
inconsistently.249
The defendant should be responsible for the plaintiff's pri-
mary damages-those damages the plaintiff would have suf-
fered had the plaintiff worn a seat belt. The plaintiff and the
defendant should share responsibility for the exacerbation
damages, because both the plaintiff's failure to buckle a seat
belt and the defendant's negligence caused the exacerbation
damages. To achieve that result, this Article proposes a two-
step analysis after the trier-of-fact determines the total dam-
ages of the plaintiff. The trier-of-fact first should determine
the plaintiff's exacerbation damages, that is, those damages
that the plaintiff could have avoided by wearing a seat belt, and
then should divide responsibility for the exacerbation damages
based on a comparison of the fault of the plaintiff in failing to
use a seat belt and the fault of the defendant in causing the
collision.250
ute gives no indication of what rule is to apply to seat belt defense cases that
do not fall under the statute. If the legislature had wanted to preclude the
adoption of the seat belt defense in cases the statute does not cover, it could
have done so explicitly with ease.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19, 167-88.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 189-220.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 221-45.
250. The possibility of this method of handling the seat belt defense is sug-
gested in Slatter, Seat Belts and Contributory Negligence, 4 DALHOUSIE L.J. 96,
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1. Step One: Cause-in-Fact, What Damages Could the
Plaintiff Have Avoided by Wearing a Seat Belt?
Once it has been established that the defendant's negli-
gence proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries and that the
plaintiff negligently failed to wear a seat belt, the trier-of-fact
should determine what damages the plaintiff's failure to wear a
seat belt caused.251 That determination is, of course, the only
damage allocation step taken by those states that apply the no-
109-10 (1977); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethink-
ing Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 327-39 (1977);
Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 29 MERC. L. REV. 373, 385-86 (1978); Comment, Torts--Seat Belts
and Contributory Negligence, 49 CANADIAN B. REv. 475, 480-81 (1971); and A
Compromise, supra note 1, at 345-46.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Waterson v. General Motors Corp.,
111 N.J. 238, 544 A.2d 357 (1988), adopted a seat belt defense damage appor-
tionment method very similar to the one advocated in this Article. For a dis-
cussion of the Waterson damage apportionment method, see infra notes 276
and 278.
A seat belt defense statute recently enacted by the Wisconsin legislature
contains a damage apportionment method that is similar in some respects to
the one advocated in this Article. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48(g) (West Supp.
1988). The statute states:
Evidence of... failure to comply with [the mandatory seat belt use
provision of this statute] is admissible in any civil action for personal
injuries or property damage resulting from the use or operation of a
motor vehicle... [With respect to injuries or damages determined to
have been caused by a failure to comply with [the mandatory use pro-
vision], such a failure shall not reduce the recovery for those injuries
or damages by more than 15%.
Id. (emphasis added).
The statute requires the first step, the causation step, of the proposal ad-
vocated in this Article. The mitigation cap applies only to those damages that
plaintiff's failure to wear a seatbelt caused-those damages referred to in this
Article as exacerbation damages. Id. Presumably, those are the only damages
that can be reduced based on plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt. The stat-
ute does not identify the basis on which the court is to reduce the damages,
but the relative fault of the parties appears to be the appropriate basis.
The Wisconsin statute is different from the proposal advocated in this Ar-
ticle in that it places a 15% cap on the reduction of exacerbation damages. Id.
In this respect, the Wisconsin statute is somewhat like the mitigation cap stat-
utes discussed supra at text accompanying notes 221-45. Like these mitigation
statutes, the Wisconsin statute limits the reduction of plaintiff's damages, and
therefore may yield results that are inconsistent with comparative fault. Be-
cause the Wisconsin statute mitigation cap applies only to exacerbation dam-
ages and is 15 percent, rather than one or five percent, however, the results
under the Wisconsin statute are likely not to be as inconsistent with compara-
tive fault as the results under the other mitigation cap statutes. The other
mitigation statutes are cited supra at note 222.
251. The defendant's negligence will not result in liability unless it caused
the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 263. The
plaintiff's negligence will not result in either preclusion of recovery under
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exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense.252
Courts have applied one of two tests to determine whether
an actor's negligent behavior caused damages. Under the tradi-
tional "but-for" test, the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt is
contributory negligence, see id, at 456, or reduction of recovery under compar-
ative negligence unless that negligence was a cause of the injury.
In tort law, the term causation is used in two very different senses. It is
used in the purely factual sense of cause-in-fact. In the context of the seat belt
defense, the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt was a cause-in-fact of those
damages that the plaintiff could have avoided by wearing a seat belt. Some
commentators argue that determinations of cause-in-fact must involve policy
considerations. See, e.g., Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L.
REV. 60, 61, 64 (1956). As Richard Wright argues, however, determining
whether something was "the cause" or "the responsible cause" involves a tor-
tious-conduct inquiry, a causal inquiry, and a proximate-cause inquiry, and the
causal inquiry should be purely a factual question-whether the actor's negli-
gence was a cause-in-fact of that harm. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1735, 1742-45 (1985).
The second causation issue, that of proximate cause, is clearly policy-
laden. In the context of the seat belt defense, the proximate cause question is
whether the connection between the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt and
the injuries that failure caused is sufficiently close that the plaintiff's failure
to wear a seat belt should reduce the plaintiff's damages. If the defendant can
show that the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt was a cause-in-fact of plain-
tiff's exacerbation damages, the defendant should have no difficulty showing
that the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt was a proximate cause of the ex-
acerbation damages under well-established proximate cause rules. At the time
of the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt, it was foreseeable that the plaintiff
might suffer injury in an automobile collision. See, e.g., Overseas Tankship
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. (Wagon Mound No. 1), 1961
A.C. 388, 426 (P.C.) (limiting defendant's responsibility to foreseeable injuries).
The injury-increased damage in an automobile collision due to failure to
wear a seat belt-is foreseeable even if the manner of the occurrence is not.
See, e.g., Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363, 374-75, 21 A.31, 32 (1891), see also
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166,
169-70, 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (1981) (noting plaintiff need not show that precise
manner of injury was foreseeable, so long as the injury was foreseeable). In
light of all of the publicity given to seat belts in recent years, it clearly is fore-
seeable that failure to use a seat belt will increase injury.
Calabresi suggests using the proximate cause requirement to limit the re-
sponsible cause to the party who is the least cost avoider. Calabresi, Concern-
ing Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CH. L.
REV. 69, 82-84 (1975). He explicitly acknowledges that in making such a sug-
gestion, he is attempting to use the flexibility of the proximate cause term to
impose liability on the least cost avoider. See id. at 82-84. In the seat belt con-
text, Calabresi would ask whether the defendant or the plaintiff who failed to
wear a seat belt is generally the least cost avoider. The least cost avoider
would be the proximate cause of the harm. The least cost avoider in seat belt
defense cases is probably the plaintiff. See supra note 29.
252. The no-exacerbation-damage recovery seat belt defense does not allow
the plaintiff any recovery for those damages that the plaintiff could have
avoided by wearing a seat belt.. See supra text accompanying notes 167-88.
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a cause of those damages that would not have occurred had the
plaintiff worn a seat belt.253 Under the "substantial factor"
test, the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt is a cause of those
damages which the failure to wear a seat belt was a substantial
factor in bringing about.2- Either test yields the same result
when applied to a seat belt defense case, because the plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt is a substantial factor in causing that
portion of plaintiff's injuries that plaintiff could have avoided
by wearing a seat belt.255 The plaintiff's failure to wear a seat
belt was not a factor in causing those damages that the plaintiff
would have suffered even if the plaintiff had worn a seat belt.
This section will discuss two cause-in-fact issues that arise
in the context of the seat belt defense. The first issue is why
courts should limit the reduction in the plaintiff's damages to
those caused by failure to wear a seat belt rather than simply
reducing the plaintiff's damages based on comparative fault.
The second issue involves the difficulty of proving which dam-
ages the plaintiff could have avoided by wearing a seat belt.
a. Why the Cause-in-fact Limitation?: The Comparative-
Fault-Reduction-of-Total-Damages Seat Belt Defense
The section of this Article on the jury discretion seat belt
defenses suggested that one likely result of giving the jury dis-
cretion as to the basis for reduction of plaintiff's damages is
that the jury will ignore the question of which injuries the
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt caused, compare the negli-
gence of the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt with the neg-
ligence of the defendant, and reduce the plaintiff's total
damages based on relative culpability.256 Such use of jury dis-
cretion is so likely that some commentators have interpreted
253. Cf. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 265-66 and cases cited
therein.
254. See, e.g., id. at 267-68 and cases cited therein. The "substantial factor"
test has substantial weaknesses, see, e.g., Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1781-84 (1985) ("substantial" introduces policy into what
should be a factual inquiry); Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence
Law, 60 MIcH. L. REV. 543, 554 (1962) (noting that "substantial" cannot be de-
fined), but is sufficient for determining which injuries the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt caused.
255. Another causation test is the "Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set"
(NESS) test, first suggested by H. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE
LAW, 111-18 (2d ed. 1985), and discussed recently in Wright, supra note 254, at
1788-1803. Application of this test to seat belt defense cases will yield the same
results as the other two tests.
256. See supra text accompanying note 212.
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decisions that do not give juries direction on the division of
damages as establishing a comparative-fault-reduction-of-total-
damages seat belt defense.257
A comparative-fault-reduction-of-total-damages rule would
be inconsistent with the almost universally recognized tort re-
quirement that negligence cause injury before that negligence
leads to consequences. "Proof of negligence in the air, so to
speak, will not do."258
If courts do not limit reduction of damages to those dam-
ages caused by the plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt, the dif-
ference in recovery can be substantial. To illustrate, assume
that the plaintiff suffers $100,000 in damages, but would have
suffered $90,000 in damages had the plaintiff worn a seat belt.
A jury compares the plaintiff's fault in failing to wear a seat
belt with the defendant's fault and assigns thirty percent of the
fault to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's recovery would be $70,000
if the comparative fault reduction applied to all of the plain-
tiff's damages, $90,000 under a no-exacerbation-damage-recov-
ery rule, and $97,000 under the rule advanced by this Article
[$100,000 - ($10,000 x 30%)]. It is unfair to reduce the $90,000
loss that the plaintiff would have suffered even if the plaintiff
had worn a seat belt because of failure to wear a seat belt.
Legal commentators have argued that the cause-in-fact re-
quirement of tort liability serves various purposes.259 Some
257. In Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639-41 (1967), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the seat belt defense. The Court did not
state how the seat belt defense was to operate. Id. at 362, 149 N.W.2d at 641.
Dean Wade suggested that in Bentzler. "the Wisconsin court mitigated dam-
ages for comparative fault but mitigated for the total damages, not just those
caused by the failure to use the seat belt." Wade, supra note 250, at 386 n.44.
In Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983), Wiscon-
sin held that the jury is to reduce the plaintiff's recovery "by the percentage
of the plaintiff's causal seat-belt negligence." 113 Wis. 2d at 486-87, 335 N.W.2d
at 829. As argued at text accompanying notes 197-200, supra, the phrase causal
seat belt negligence is so ambiguous that under it the jury could reduce plain-
tiff's damages based solely on causation, solely on comparison of fault, or on
some combination of the two.
258. Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 170, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (1920) (citing F.
POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTs 472 (10th ed. 1916)).
259. Professor Calabresi suggests that the cause-in-fact requirement aids
the tort system's goal of economic efficiency, that is, it helps to minimize the
sum of injury costs and safety costs. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the
Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 69, 84-85
(1975). Calabresi believes that courts should place liability on the cheapest
cost avoider-that person who has the best knowledge of the risks and the
ways to avoid them, and can most cheaply take the safety steps that could
avoid the loss. See id. at 84. When the cheapest cost avoiders know that they
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suggest that it protects the rights of the individual and encour-
ages freedom of action.260 The negligence system imposes lia-
bility on defendants or reduces the recovery of plaintiffs only
when their negligence has caused harm. As far as tort liability
is concerned, a person is free to act negligently so long as that
negligence does no harm. If the legislature believes that a fur-
ther limitation of freedom is justified, it can limit behavior
through legislation, as many legislatures have done with stat-
utes requiring seat belt use.26 1 In the context of the seat belt
defense, absent a statutory requirement of seat belt use, people
should be free either to wear a seat belt or not to wear a seat
belt. The failure to wear a seat belt should reduce the plain-
tiff's damages only if the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt
caused those damages.
Finally, the cause-in-fact requirement also serves the tort
system's goal of corrective justice by requiring a defendant who
tortiously causes injury to compensate the victim for losses the
defendant's negligence caused and thus correct the imbalance
in the distribution of wealth created by the injury.26 2 When the
plaintiff's negligence also has caused a portion of the plaintiff's
bear the risk of loss, it will be in their interest to calculate whether the costs
of safety are less than the risks of injury, and to make efficient choices. See
id. Calabresi argues that the cause-in-fact requirement serves the economic ef-
ficiency goal because it "is simply a useful way of toting up some of the costs
the cheapest cost avoider should face in deciding whether avoidance is worth-
while." Id. at 85.
As noted previously in this Article, if a jurisdiction is to follow a cheapest
cost avoider/economic efficiency theory on the seat belt defense issues, it will
probably adopt a no-exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense. The
plaintiff can avoid the exacerbation damages at the cheapest cost by buckling
his seat belt. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The seat belt defense
advocated herein, however, is based on a corrective justice/comparative fault
justification, which does not support imposing the entire cost of the accident
on plaintiffs. Therefore, Calabresi's economic justification for the cause-in-fact
requirement does not help to justify the cause-in-fact limitation on the seat
belt defense advocated in this Article.
260. See, e.g., Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI-KENT L. REV.
407, 411 (1987) (citing Thomson, Remarks on Causation and Liability, 13 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 101, 107-12 (1984), reprinted in J.J. THOMPSON, RIGHTS, RESTITU-
TION, AND RISK 199-202 (1989)). Professor Paul Zwier finds the roots of the
cause-in-fact requirement in the concern of the Puritans with the rights of the
individual to be free from governmental control. Zwier, "Cause in fact" in
Tort Law-A Philosophical and Historical Examination, 31 DE PAUL L. REV.
769, 784-96 (1982).
261. See supra note 31.
262. As one commentator has stated: "[A) person who disrupts [society's
conception of the just distribution of wealth] does an injustice that must be
corrected ... by paying compensation. To be specific, a person who causes a
tortious accident must compensate the victim in order to restore a just distri-
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injury, the plaintiff should help to bear the responsibility for
that portion of the loss which the plaintiff's negligence caused.
In seat belt defense cases, courts should limit the damages
that are subject to reduction to those damages caused by plain-
tiff's failure to wear a seat belt. Courts should not reduce the
damages that the plaintiff would have suffered even if the
plaintiff had worn a seat belt, based on the plaintiff's unrelated
negligence.2 63 A court might as well reduce the plaintiff's dam-
ages because the plaintiff was negligent on the day before the
injury or because the plaintiff is a disagreeable person.
b. Difficult Causation Cases
In some seat belt defense cases, it will be difficult for the
defendant to establish which losses the plaintiff would have
avoided by wearing a seat belt. Nevertheless, some courts ap-
pear strictly to require the defendant to demonstrate those
damages.264 A similar problem of proof arises in cases in which
the negligence of two parties caused different injuries to the
plaintiff, and it is difficult for the plaintiff to prove who caused
which portion of the harm.265 Courts often leave division of
such dAmages to the jury's estimate.26 6 A similar flexibility is
bution of wealth." Cooter, Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An
Essay on Causation, 63 CHI-KENT L. REV. 523, 546 (1987).
263. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Waterson v. General Motors
Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 271, 544 A.2d 357, 374 (1988), said:
[Wie do not believe that the court should reduce the full amount of
damages caused by injury in an automobile accident by an arbitrary
percentage determined by the jury to reflect a plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt. Indisputably, in a case such as this one, plaintiff's
failure to wear her seat belt had absolutely nothing to do with the
accident.
264. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Alaska 1986);
Franklin v. Gibson, 138 Cal. App. 3d 340, 343, 188 Cal. Rptr. 23, 24-25 (1982).
265. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, at 348-52 and cases cited
therein.
266.
Evidence may be entirely lacking upon which to apportion some
elements of the damages, such as medical expenses, or permanent dis-
ability, or the plaintiff's pain and suffering....
There have appeared in the decisions a number of similar situa-
tions, in some of which the extent of the harm inflicted by the sepa-
rate torts has been almost incapable of any definite and satisfactory
proof, and has been left merely to the jury's estimate.
Franklin, 138 Cal. App. at 348, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
Under comparative fault, courts may tend to send to the jury seat belt de-
fense cases in which proof of the amount of avoidable damages is unclear
under what Twerski has called "comparative-cause-in-fact." Twerski, The
Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of Compara-
tive Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403, 413-14 (1978). Traditionally, of course,
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justified in the seat belt defense cases. In a case in which exact
proof of damages the plaintiff could have avoided by wearing a
seat belt is not available, the injustice of a somewhat incorrect
estimate by the jury is less serious than the greater injustice of
not allowing the seat belt defense.
2. Step Two: Compare the Plaintiff's Failure to Wear a Seat
Belt with the Defendant's Fault
The second step of the seat belt defense proposed by this
Article is allocation of responsibility for the exacerbation dam-
ages, those damages that the plaintiff could have avoided by
wearing a seat belt. The negligence of both of the parties
caused the exacerbation damages, and the trier-of-fact should
divide responsibility based on comparative fault principles. The
trier-of-fact should assign a percentage of responsibility to each
of the parties at fault in causing the exacerbation damages.
The court should reduce the plaintiff's recovery of exacerba-
tion damages by the percentage of fault assigned to the plain-
tiff.26 7 The goal of the seat belt defense proposed by this
causation-in-fact is an all-or-nothing proposition. The judge sends an issue of
cause-in-fact to the jury if reasonable people could conclude that it is more
likely than not that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff's damages.
If not, the judge directs a verdict for the defendant. If the jury considers that
it is more likely than not that the defendant's negligence caused such dam-
ages, cause-in-fact is established. If not, the plaintiff is allowed no recovery.
Twerski argues that the development of comparative fault may lead courts to
be less rigid in requiring evidence of cause-in-fact before sending a case to the
jury. In a comparative negligence case in which either the plaintiff's or the
defendant's proof of cause-in-fact is questionable, the court might send the
matter to a jury, knowing that the jury can compromise the recovery. In seat
belt defense cases in which the defendant's proof of which damages the plain-
tiff could have avoided by wearing a seat belt is questionable, courts may allow
the matter to go to the jury rather than reject the defendant's seat belt de-
fense, and the jury might err on the side of low exacerbation damages rather
than deny the defendant any diminution of damages.
267. A substantial number of jurisdictions apply "pure" comparative fault.
Under pure comparative fault, even if the trier-of-fact attributes a majority of
the fault to the plaintiff, the plaintiff still can recover. The trier-of-fact simply
reduces the plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of fault attributed to the
plaintiff. See, e.g., SCHVARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 47-48 (2d ed. 1986).
The majority of jurisdictions have adopted one of the "modified" compara-
tive fault systems. Under one form of modified comparative fault, the plaintiff
may not recover unless the plaintiff's negligence is "not as great as" that of
the defendant. Under the other form of modified comparative fault, the plain-
tiff's fault must be "not greater than" that of the defendant. See, e.g., id. at 69-
72. Numerous arguments have been made against the modified comparative
negligence approaches. The problem with modified comparative negligence
approaches is that, like contributory negligence, in some cases they impose on
one party the entire loss that was caused by the negligence of two parties. See,
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Article, as of comparative fault generally, is that responsibility
e.g., id. at 363. They do not allow the plaintiff who is credited with 51% of the
fault to recover anything from the defendant who is credited with 49% of the
fault. For an extensive comparison of modified and pure comparative fault,
see id. at 360-63.
In a modified comparative negligence jurisdiction, what should be the ef-
fect of the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt? Some jurisdictions consider
the failure to wear a seat belt as part of the plaintiff's negligence for purposes
of determining whether or not the plaintiff's negligence is equal to or less
than that of the defendant. See Cannon v. Lardner, 185 Ga. App. 194, -, 363
S.E.2d 574, 576 (1987); Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F. Supp.
1561, 1564 (D. Vt. 1985). Others do not consider the plaintiff's failure to wear
a seat belt in determining whether the plaintiff's negligence is equal to or less
than that of the defendant. See Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475,
489-90, 335 N.W.2d 824, 833 (1983); Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 111 N.J.
238, 241, 544 A.2d 357, 358 (1988).
In Foley, under the Wisconsin modified comparative negligence statute,
the trial court considered the plaintiffs' failure to wear seat belts in detemin-
ing whether the plaintiffs' negligence was greater than defendants' negligence.
The negligence of one plaintiff, Daniel Foley, in causing the accident was less
than the negligence of any defendant, but his negligence in causing the acci-
dent when combined with his negligence in failing to wear a seat belt was
greater than the negligence of any defendant. Foley, 113 Wis. 2d at 480-81, 335
N.W.2d at 826-27. The negligence of the plaintiff, Zita Foley, in failing to wear
her seat belt was greater than the negligence of any defendant. Under the
Wisconsin statute, the trial court denied a recovery to either plaintiff. Id at
478-82, 335 N.W.2d at 826-27. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court distin-
guished seat belt negligence from the plaintiffs' negligence in causing the acci-
dent and noted that the Wisconsin comparative fault statute does not require
courts to compare seat belt negligence with the negligence of the defendant in
causing the accident. Id& at 478-82, 335 N.W.2d at 826, 830. The court stated:
[I]t is not logical or necessary to view the negligence causing the colli-
sion together with plaintiff's seat-belt negligence in a one-dimen-
sional way when there are actually two distinct incidents contributing
to the injuries. In addition, the circuit court's interpretation of the
statute and the seat-belt defense would cause inequitable results, be-
cause the defendant could have a windfall. For example, in this case,
Zita and Daniel Foley receive no compensation for damages that thejury determined they could not have totally prevented, and the de-
fendants escape liability for injuries the jury determined their negli-
gence caused. We do not think such a result is reasonable if the goal
is a system of tort law that is both fair and administrable. We should
seek to treat the plaintiff and defendant in such a way that the plain-
tiff recovers damages from the defendant for the injuries that the de-
fendant caused, but that the defendant is not held liable for
incremental injuries the plaintiff could and should have prevented by
wearing an available seat belt.
Id. at 488-89, 335 N.W.2d at 830-31.
The court thus adopted a rule under which the trier-of-fact compares only
the plaintiff's negligence in causing the collision with the negligence of the de-
fendant to determine whether the plaintiff may recover under the modified
comparative negligence statute. The trier-of-fact reduces the plaintiff's recov-
ery based on failure to wear a seat belt, but the failure to wear a seat belt does
not affect the plaintiff's ability to recover. Id at 489, 335 N.W.2d at 831. In
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for the damages caused by both of the parties be allocated
based on their relative fault.
One commentator, Professor Aaron Twerski, has argued
that it would be difficult for juries to compare the fault of the
plaintiff in failing to wear a seat belt with the fault of the de-
fendant in causing the collision.268 In comparative fault cases,
however, the trier-of-fact often compares the negligence of one
party with a different kind of conduct on the part of the other
party. In some jurisdictions, the trier-of-fact compares the neg-
ligence of the plaintiff with the recklessness of the defend-
ant,2 69 and in some jurisdictions, the trier-of-fact compares the
plaintiff's assumption of risk with the defendant's negli-
gence.27 0 In addition, in a growing number of states, the trier-
of-fact in strict products liability cases compares the plaintiff's
negligence with the defendant's production of a defective prod-
uct.271 Comparisons of such varying types of fault and nonfault
do not appear to have created substantial problems.
Twerski objects to comparing the plaintiff's negligent fail-
ure to wear a seat belt with the defendant's negligence on two
bases. Twerski's first basis for objection is that the negligence
"took place at different times. '272 The fact that the negligence
of the plaintiff and the defendant took place at different times
should not, however, create substantial problems for a jury in
comparing fault. In comparative fault cases, the negligence of
the plaintiff and the negligence of the defendant often take
place at different times.2 7 3 Moreover, product defect cases, in
which Twerski advocates the application of comparative fault
Foley, Daniel Foley's negligence in causing the collision was less than the neg-
ligence of any of the defendants. Zita Foley did not negligently cause the colli-
sion, and therefore the court allowed both plaintiffs to recover. Id. at 490-91,
335 N.W.2d at 831.
268. See Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking
Some Products Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 329 (1977).
269. See, e.g., Sorensen v. Allred, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 725, 169 Cal. Rptr.
441, 445-46 (1980); see also Annotation, Application of Comparative Negligence
in Action Based on Gross Negligence, Recklessness, or the Like, 10 A.L.R.4th
946, 948-52 (1981).
270. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 879, 142 Cal. Rptr.
503, 505 (1977); see also Annotation, Effect of Adoption of Comparative Negli-
gence Rules on Assumption of Risk, 16 A.L.R.4th 700, 711-15 (1982).
271. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 734-35, 575 P.2d
1162, 1165-73, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384-93 (1978).
272. Twerski, supra note 268, at 329. Twerski, however, supports compar-
ing the negligence of the plaintiffs with the defendant's creation of defective
products. Id at 347-48.
273. See, e.g, Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 731, 575 P.2d
1162, 1165, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383 (1978); see also Annotation, Applicability of
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principles, typically involve plaintiff negligence that occurs long
after the defendant manufactures a defective product.2
7 4
The second basis on which Twerski objects to the applica-
tion of comparative fault to the exacerbation damages under
the seat belt defense is that the negligence of the plaintiff and
the defendant "played different roles. ' 275 The negligence of
the plaintiff and the defendant do play different roles in the
seat belt defense cases. The defendant's negligence causes all
of the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff's negligence causes only
the exacerbation damages. As to the exacerbation damages,
however, the plaintiff's negligence and the defendant's negli-
gence share the key characteristic. The negligence of both the
plaintiff and the defendant caused the plaintiff's exacerbation
damages, and courts should divide responsibility for those dam-
ages based on relative fault.
3. Plaintiffs Who Negligently Cause Accidents and Fail to
Use Seat Belts
The plaintiff may be at fault in causing the accident, as
well as being at fault in failing to wear a seat belt. This situa-
tion adds a complication to the seat belt defense which courts
should handle in the following manner.
Step One, Causation: Under the proposal advanced in this
Article, the trier-of-fact first will answer the same causation
question suggested previously. The trier-of-fact will determine
which damages the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt caused.
There will, however, be two comparative fault evaluations.
One determines responsibility for the plaintiff's primary dam-
ages, those damages that the plaintiff would have suffered even
if the plaintiff had worn a seat belt. The second determines re-
sponsibility for plaintiff's exacerbation damages, those damages
suffered because of the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt.
Step Two, Comparative Fault - Primary Damages: Regard-
ing plaintiff's primary damages, the trier-of-fact should allot a
percentage of fault to each of the defendants and to the plain-
tiff, for each person's fault in causing the collision, the total to
equal 100%. The court should reduce the plaintiff's recovery of
primary damages by the percentage of fault allotted to the
plaintiff.
Comparative Negligence Doctrine to Actions Based on Strict Liability in Tort,
9 A.L.R.4th 633 (1981).
274. Twerski, supra note 268, at 329.
275. See supra text accompanying note 272.
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Step Three, Comparative Fault - Exacerbation Damages:
The court should reduce the plaintiff's exacerbation damage re-
covery both for negligence in failing to wear a seat belt and for
fault in causing the accident. Both of these negligent acts
caused the plaintiff's exacerbation damages. The trier-of-fact
should assign a percentage of fault to the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt when that failure is compared with the com-
bined negligence of all of the defendants and with the negli-
gence of the plaintiff in causing the collision. The judge will
use this percentage of fault for failing to wear a seat belt to re-
duce exacerbation damage recovery.
The judge first should calculate the percentage of fault for
causing the accident to use in reducing the plaintiff's exacerba-
tion damage recovery. To do this, the judge should deduct the
percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff's failure to wear a
seat belt from 100%. The judge should divide responsibility for
the remaining percentage of fault based on the jury's earlier
assignment of responsibility for causing the accident (from step
two). The judge should do this by using the following formula:
Percentage of 100% minus the Percentage of
negligence to be percentage of fault negligence assigned
assigned to plaintiff's assigned to plaintiff's to plaintiff's
negligence in causing = failure to wear a seat negligence in causing
the collision when - belt x the accident when
calculating compared with all
exacerbation damage negligence causing
recovery the accident (from
step two)
The judge should reduce the plaintiff's recovery of
exacerbation damages by the sum of this percentage and the
percentage allocated by the jury to the plaintiff's fault in
failing to wear a seat belt. The court will give the plaintiff
judgment for the plaintiff's total damages, minus the reduction
from primary damages calculated in step two and the reduction
from exacerbation damages calculated in step three.276
For example, assume that in a seat belt defense case, the
276. The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a method of damage
apportionment that is similar to the one advocated in this Article in Waterson
v. General Motors Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 544 A.2d 357 (1988). Under Waterson, as
under this Article's proposal, the jury determines plaintiff's exacerbation
damages, called seat-belt damages by the New Jersey court, id. at 272, 544 A.2d
at 374, and determines the comparative fault of each party for causing the
accident. Id. at 272-73, 544 A.2d at 375. The New Jersey method of
determining the parties' responsibility for exacerbation damages, however, is
somewhat different from the method proposed in this Article. Under the New
Jersey method,
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jury concludes that the plaintiff has suffered $30,000 total
After the jury has... found (1) that the failure to use a seat belt
constituted negligence and (2) that plaintiff sustained avoidable,
second-collision [exacerbation] injuries, the jury must then determine
the percentage of plaintiff's comparative fault for damages arising
from those injuries. The total negligence for these second-collision or
seat-belt damages consists of (a) defendant's negligence in causing the
accident (since without that negligence there would have been no
accident and no injuries of any kind), (b) plaintiff's comparative
negligence, if any, in causing the accident (since, again, without
plaintiff's comparative negligence there would have been no accident
and no injuries), and (c) plaintiff's negligence in failing to use a seat-
belt (since without that negligence there would not have been any
second collision injuries). The total fault for these seat belt damages,
as for all damages, is one-hundred percent. Thus, the jury must
determine the percentage of plaintiff's fault for these damages that
are attributable to plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt. If the jury
previously found a percentage division of fault between plaintiff and
defendant in causing the accident, the jury must be told that the
court, when finally molding the jury findings into the verdict, will
continue that proportion of fault when adding in the percentage
attributable to plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt.
For example, if a jury found plaintiff twenty percent liable for an
accident and defendant eighty percent liable for the accident, and,
further, that plaintiff was twenty percent liable for plaintiff's seat-
belt damages due to his failure to use a seat belt, the court would
mold these three findings of fault in determining plaintiff's recovery
for those damages. The three percentages of fault add up to 120%.
The court would add the two findings of plaintiff's negligence (twenty
percent for causing the accident, twenty percent for failure to use a
seat belt), which total forty percent. The sum of forty percent would
become the numerator of a fraction in which the denominator would
be 120, or the total of all three findings of negligence (defendant's
eighty percent fault for causing the accident, plaintiff's twenty
percent fault for causing the accident, and plaintiff's twenty percent
fault for not wearing a seat belt). This fraction results in a finding of
33 1/3%, which reflects the amount by which the court would reduce
plaintiff's recovery for seat-belt damages due to the negligent failure
to use a seat belt.
Id. at 272-74, 544 A.2d at 375.
Under both the New Jersey rule and this Article's proposal, the jury as-
signs a percentage of fault to the failure of the plaintiff to wear a seat belt
when compared with the negligence of the defendant and the plaintiff in caus-
ing the collision. The methods differ in that under this Article's method, the
jury is instructed that the total is to equal 100%. Under the New Jersey
method, the percentage assigned to the failure to wear a seat belt is added to
the 100% responsibility for causing the accident. Under both methods, the
court then determines the appropriate reduction of damages based on the
jury's determination of the defendant's and plaintiff's relative fault in causing
the accident and the plaintiff's relative fault in causing the exacerbation dam-
ages.
Assuming that a jury, when comparing the plaintiff's failure to wear a
seat belt with the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligence in causing the col-
lision will assign proportionately the same percentage of fault to the plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt, the resulting judgment will be the same under
either method. This is illustrated infra at note 278 and accompanying text.
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damages and that if the plaintiff had worn a seat belt, the
plaintiff would have suffered only a $10,000 loss. When
comparing the plaintiff's and the defendant's fault in causing
the collision, the jury assesses each at fifty percent. When the
jury compares the plaintiff's fault in failing to wear a seat belt
with the negligence of both the plaintiff and defendant in
causing the collision, the jury finds the plaintiff's fault in
failing to wear a seat belt is twenty percent.2 7 7 The following
table illustrates the method for calculating the plaintiff's
recovery.
Step One: Causation
Plaintiff's total damages (det. by jury) $30,000
Primary damages (damages if plaintiff had worn seat belt)
(det. by jury) -10,000
Exacerbation Damages $20,000
Step Two: Comparative Fault, Primary Damages
Fault of plaintiff for causing accident (det. by jury) 50%
Fault of defendant for causing accident (det. by jury) 50%
Primary damages $10,000
Plaintiff's fault for causing accident 
__09_
Reduction of recovery of primary damages $5,000
Primary damages $10,000
Reduction of primary damages for plaintiff's fault -56 000
Primary damage recovery of plaintiff $5,000
Step Three: Comparative Fault, Exacerbation Damages
Fault of plaintiff in failing to wear seat belt, compared with
all negligence causing accident (jury det.) 20%
Fault of plaintiff and defendants in causing the collision
when compared with plaintiff's failure to wear seat belt
(100% - 20%) 80%
Fault of plaintiff in causing accident, when compared with
plaintiff's failure to use seat belt and defendant's fault in
causing the accident (80% x 50%) 40%
Plaintiff's fault in causing exacerbation damages (20% +
40%) 60%278
Note 278 applies the New Jersey method to a set of facts, and the accompany-
ing text applies this Article's method to the same facts.
Although the New Jersey method will yield the same result as the
method proposed in this Article, the New Jersey method may be somewhat
confusing to a jury because the jury is to determine the total responsibility for
the exacerbation damages to be greater than 100%.
277. The facts used in this example are taken from a hypothetical posed in
A Compromise, supra note 1, at 347.
278. Under the New Jersey method of damage reduction, see supra note
276, the jury assigns a percentage of fault to the plaintiff's failure to wear a
seat belt when compared with the fault of the defendant and the plaintiff in
causing the accident. The total is not limited to 100%. Waterson, 111 N.J. at
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Exacerbation damages (from step one) $20,000
Plaintiff's fault in causing exacerbation damages x60%
Reduction of exacerbation damages for plaintiff's fault $12,000
Exacerbation damages (from step one) $20,000
Reduction of exacerbation damages for plaintiff's fault -12.000
Exacerbation damage recovery of plaintiff $8,000
Total Judgment of Plaintiff
Primary damage recovery of plaintiff $5,000
Exacerbation damage recovery of plaintiff -8.000
Judgment for plaintiff $13,000279
In jurisdictions where the court assigns damage responsibility
272-74, 544 A.2d at 375. Under this Article's method of damage reduction, the
jury assigns a percentage of fault to the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt
when compared with the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant in
causing the collision, but the total responsibility for the exacerbation damages
is to equal 100%. In the example discussed in the text, under this Article's
method, the jury assigns 20 percent of the fault to the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt. Under the New Jersey method, if the jury assigns
proportionately the same percentage of fault to the plaintiff's failure to wear a
seat belt, it will .assign 25 percent of the responsibility for exacerbation
damages to the failure to wear a seat belt, because 25 percent bears the same
relation to 125 percent as 20 percent bears to 100 percent. Each is one-fifth of
the total percentage of fault. Under the New Jersey method, "[t]he court
would add the two findings of plaintiff's negligence." Id. at 273, 544 A.2d at
375. Fifty percent (for causing the accident) plus 25 percent (for failing to
wear a seat belt) equals 75 percent. "The sum [75 percent] would become the
numerator of a fraction in which the denominator would be... the total of all
three findings of negligence (defendant's [50 percent] fault for causing the
accident, plaintiff's [50 percent] fault for causing the accident, and plaintiff's
[25 percent] fault for not wearing a seat belt)." Id. Fifty percent plus 50




Therefore, plaintiff's responsibility for exacerbation damages would be the
same, 60 percent, under either the New Jersey method or this Article's
method.
279. A Compromise, supra note 1, at 347, suggests determining the
plaintiff's damages in a somewhat different manner from that suggested in
this Article. In the course of the discussion, the author refers to the plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt as "passive negligence," and to the negligence of the
parties in causing the collision as "active negligence." Those damages the
plaintiff would have suffered even if wearing a seat belt--called "primary
damages" in this Article--are referred to as "first collision" damages. Those
damages the plaintiff suffered as a result of failure to wear a seat belt-
"exacerbation damages" in this Article-are called "second collision" damages.
The author proposes:
[T]he jury should first determine the percentage of comparative fault
attributable to the active negligence [i.e., fault in causing the collision]
of both parties. Once this has been accomplished, the jury should
then single out the plaintiff's passive fault in failing to buckle up and
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attribute to it a separate fault percentage. This would allow a court to
accomplish the fault comparison on each separate collision.
... [T]he court should compare the percentages attributed to the
active fault of both parties and distribute those first collision
[primary] damages accordingly.
With regard to the second collision, the total percentage of
plaintiff's comparative fault should equal the sum of his
predetermined active fault percentage and the predetermined
percentage of his passive fault that was solely attributable to nonuse
of a seat belt. The plaintiff's total percentage of fault should then be
compared with the fault of the defendant in distributing the costs of
the second collision [exacerbation) injuries. Let us assume, for
example, that the defendant has introduced the requisite expert
evidence, which apportions the damages into $10,000 for the first
collision [primary damages] and $20,000 for the second collision
[exacerbation damages]. Let us further assume that the jury has
found plaintiff to be fifty percent at fault for his active negligence in
causing the accident, and twenty percent at fault for his passive
negligence in failing to buckle up. As the court accomplishes a fault
comparison on each collision individually, the result would yield fifty
percent fault (plaintiff) / fifty percent fault (defendant) for the first
collision, and seventy percent fault (plaintiff) / thirty percent fault
(defendant) for the second collision. Accordingly, the plaintiff would
recover $5,000 of his first collision [primary] injuries and $6,000 of his
second collision [exacerbation] injuries, for a total recovery of $11,000.
Id at 346-47 (footnotes omitted).
The proposal errs in its calculation of responsibility for exacerbation (or
second collision) damages. If in determining the plaintiff's responsibility for
exacerbation (or second collision) damages, the court merely adds the plain-
tiff's percentage of responsibility for failure to wear a seat belt to the earlier
calculation of responsibility for causing the collision, the plaintiff is given too
high a percentage of responsibility for causing the collision. The plaintiff's
percentage of responsibility for causing the collision is a relative number, and
it will change if the court is calculating responsibility for damages that addi-
tional negligent acts caused. When the court is determining responsibility for
exacerbation damages, it must consider both fault in failing to wear a seat belt
and the fault of the parties in causing the collision. Because the court is con-
sidering a cause of the injuries-failure to wear a seat belt-in addition to the
causes compared during the earlier calculation, the court should reduce the
percentages initially allotted to the causes of the collision proportionately. In
the example suggested in A Compromise, which is evaluated in the text herein
supra following note 277, in the calculation of responsibility for exacerbation
(second collision) damages, allocation to the plaintiff of 20% of the fault for
failure to wear a seat belt (passive negligence) should not reduce the defend-
ant's fault for causing the accident (active negligence) to 30% and leave the
plaintiff's fault for causing the accident (active negligence) at 50%. If the
plaintiff's and the defendant's fault in causing the accident were equal at the
first calculation, they should be equal at the second calculation. The court
should reduce the responsibility of each party for causing the accident propor-
tionately, so that each retains the same degree of fault for causing the accident
relative to the other. As suggested herein, see text supra following 277, when
calculating responsibility for exacerbation (second collision) damages, the
plaintiff's degree of responsibility for causing the collision should be 40% (80%
x 50%), rather than 50%. The plaintiff's responsibility for exacerbation dam-
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among the defendants for comparative contribution purposes, 280
the court can assign responsibility to the individual defendants
by the same method.28 '
ages should be 60% (40% + 20%), not 70%. The plaintiff's total recovery
should be $13,000, not $11,000.
The difference in results between the two proposals will be more substan-
tial in cases in which the trier-of-fact attributes a higher percentage of fault to
the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt. If under the example used, the jury
assessed the plaintiff's fault for failuire to wear a seat belt at 50%, rather than
20%, the plaintiff would get no recovery of exacerbation damages under the
proposal suggested in A Compromise ($20,000 x 0%) and $5,000 under the pro-
posal advanced in this Article ($20,000 x 25%).
280. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578-617, 578 P.2d 899, 901-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 182-208
(1978); see also U.C.F.A. § 2(b), supra note 202 (noting court should divide
responsibility for damages between parties causing harm based on relative
fault); Annotation, Contribution or Indemnity Between Joint Tortfeasors on
Basis of Relative Fault, 53 A.L.R.3d 184, 184-226 (1973) (discussing fault
apportionment and doctrine of comparative negligence).
281. The court should assign to the defendants responsibility for the
plaintiff's primary damages based on the percentages stated by the jury in its
comparative fault calculation of the responsibility of all of the parties in
causing the accident. The court should allocate responsibility for exacerbation
damages as follows: for each defendant, the court should multiply the sum of
exacerbation damage responsibility allotted to the plaintiff and to the
defendants for causing the collision (i.e., 100% minus plaintiff's percentage of
negligence for failing to wear a seat belt) by the percentage of fault attributed
to that defendant for causing the accident. For example, assume in the
example given supra text following note 277, that there were two negligent
defendants. Plaintiff's negligence in causing the accident remains 50%.
Defendant l's share of negligence for causing the accident is 20%, and
defendant 2's share is 30%. The court should calculate responsibility of each
defendant as follows:
Primary Damage Responsibility
Plaintiff's primary damages $10,000
Defendant l's percentage of fault for causing accident x20%
Defendant l's responsibility for primary damages $2,000
Plaintiff's primary damages $10,000
Defendants 2's percentage of fault for causing accident x30T
Defendant 2's responsibility for primary damages $3,000
Exacerbation Damage Responsibility
Percentage of fault for causing exacerbation damages
allocated to all negligent causes of accident (i.e., all
causes but plaintiff's failure to wear seat belt) 80%
Defendant l's percentage of fault causing collision,
compared with other causes of the collision x20%
Defendant l's percentage of fault for causing the
exacerbation damages 16%
Total exacerbation damages x$20,000
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4. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the Seat Belt
Defense
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act ("UCFA") was ap-
proved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in 1977.282 Although the UCFA does not
explicitly suggest a step-by-step method of seat belt defense
damage reduction, it provides further support for the seat belt
defense proposed in this Article. Although the legislatures of
only two states, Iowa28 3 and Washington,28 4 have adopted the
UCFA, it has had a substantial impact on judicial decisions in
other jurisdictions. 28 5 The UCFA creates a system of compara-
tive fault that resolves many of the complications created by
the shift from contributory negligence to comparative fault, and
attempts to provide uniformity throughout the country.28 6
Under the UCFA, when assigning responsibility for dam-
ages, courts compare the fault of the parties, including "unrea-
sonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. ' '28 7
The comment to Section 1 of the UCFA uses the plaintiff's fail-
ure to wear a seat belt as an example of fault that will reduce
recovery.28 8
The first damage reduction step under the UCFA is to de-
termine which damages the plaintiff's fault caused. The plain-
tiff's fault diminishes recovery proportionately "for an injury
Defendant l's share of exacerbation damages $3,200
Percentage of fault for causing exacerbation damages
allocated to all negligent causes of the accident
(100%-20%) 80%
Defendant 2's percentage of fault causing collision
compared with other causes of the collision x300
Defendant 2's percentage of fault for causing exacerbation
damages 24%
Total exacerbation damages x$20,000
Defendant 2's share of exacerbation damages $4,000
Cf. Vermont's contributory fault statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1036 (1973 &
Supp. 1988) (When recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each
defendant is liable for that portion of total dollar amount awarded as damages
in ratio of amount of his or her causal negligence to amount of causal negli-
gence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed.)
282. U.C.F.A. historical note, supra note 202, at 39.
283. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 668.1 to 668.14 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988).
284. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.005 to 4.22.925 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
285. See, e.g., Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, -, 753 P.2d
585, 602, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 646 (1988); Arctic Structures Inc. v. Wedmore, 605
P.2d 426, 432, n.17 (Alaska 1979); Hilen v. Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984);
Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Ky. 1987).
286. U.C.F.A. prefatory note, supra note 202, at 39.
287. U.C.F.A. § 1(b), supra note 202, at 39-40.
288. U.C.F.A. comment to § 1, supra note 202, quoted infra note 290.
1989] 1447
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
attributable to," that is, an injury caused by, the plaintiff's
fault.28 9 According to the comments, "negligent failure to
fasten a seat belt would diminish recovery only for damages in
which the lack of a seat-belt restraint played a part, and not,
for example, to the damage to the car."
290
The second seat belt defense damage reduction step under
the UCFA is the same step advocated in this Article. The court
reduces the plaintiff's recovery based on the plaintiff's relative
fault. The UCFA states that the recovery is diminished "pro-
portionately,"2 91 based on the fault of the parties.
292
This interpretation of the UCFA is consistent with the pur-
pose of comparative fault in that the parties share responsibil-
ity for damages caused by their negligence based on their
relative fault. John Wade, the chairman of the committee that
drafted the UCFA, shares this interpretation.
2 93
289. U.C.F.A. § 1 states: "[A]ny contributory fault chargeable to the claim-
ant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages
for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault..." Id. § 1(a)
(emphasis added).
290. U.C.F.A. comment to § 1, supra note 202 at 41. The comment to sec-
tion 1 also states:
Causation. For the conduct stigmatized as fault to have any effect
under the provisions of this Act it must have had an adequate causal
relation to the claimant's damage. This includes the rules of both
cause in fact and proximate cause.
"Injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault" refers to
the requirement of a causal relation for the particular damage.
The comment does not explicitly state that the plaintiff is entitled to a full re-
covery of those personal injuries that were not caused by failure to wear a seat
belt. The comment explicitly answers only the easy question: the plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt does not diminish recovery for damage to the car.
Personal injury damages not caused by plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt,
however, also fit into the category of damages for which the lack of a seat belt
does not play a part and should not be subject to mitigation due to plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt.
291. U.C.F.A. § 1(a).
292. U.C.F.A. § 2(b). See also supra text accompanying notes 205-09 (ex-
plaining fault apportionment under U.C.F.A.).
293. Dean Wade makes the argument:
The [U.C.F.A.] provides that "fault" includes "unreasonable failure to
avoid injury or to mitigate damages" (§ 1(b)). This should be read to-
gether with another sentence providing that plaintiff's contributory
fault proportionately diminishes the amount awarded as damages "for
an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault" (§ 1(a)).
The Act therefore covers the concept of avoidable consequences and
provides that for a particular injury that could have been avoided by
the plaintiff or for the diminution of damages that he could have ef-
fected by the exercise of reasonable care, the amount will be dimin-
ished proportionately according to the comparative fault of the
parties. Thus, suppose the plaintiff was driving a new car with due
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Although a careful reading of the UCFA discloses that it
supports the seat belt defense advocated in this Article, it is un-
fortunate that the UCFA does not state more clearly how
courts are to divide responsibility under the seat belt defense.
The danger of this failure is illustrated in a Kentucky case,
Wemyss v. Coleman,2 94 the only case to discuss the application
of the UCFA to the seat belt defense. Kentucky applies the
UCFA as its form of comparative fault based on judicial deci-
sion.295 The Kentucky court favorably cites the traditional
avoidable consequences rule, under which courts do not allow
plaintiffs any recovery for damages they could have avoided by
exercising reasonable care after the injury, and states that the
same rule should apply to the plaintiff's negligent failure to
wear a seat belt prior to injury.296 The court fails to deal with
portions of the UCFA which indicate that courts are to divide
damage responsibility "proportionately 297 based on "the na-
ture of the conduct of each party. '2 98 The court adopts a no-
exacerbation-damage-recovery seat belt defense. 299 This defense
care, when due to defect the left front wheel locked, causing him to
swerve and hit a tree. Plaintiff had not buckled his seat belt and as a
result his head hit the windshield and his face was damaged. His leg
was broken, but this would have happened even if the seat belt had
been buckled. He would not consent to medical treatment of the bro-
ken leg and the bone has not knit together. His recovery for both the
facial injury and the untreated leg will be diminished, but -for separate
reasons (avoidable injury, and failure to mitigate damages). The dam-
ages to his car will not be mitigated.
Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REv. 373, 385-86 (1978) (emphasis added).
294. 729 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1987).
295. Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Ky. 1987) (quoting Hilen v.
Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984)).
296. The court stated:
[T]he doctrine of avoidable consequences . . . 'serves to mitigate the
damages ... to the extent the patient's injury was aggravated or in-
creased by his own negligence.'
The same principle should apply to the antecedent negligence of
the plaintiff, if any, to the extent the injury was aggravated or in-
creased by his own negligence."
729 S.W.2d at 178 (citation omitted).
297. U.C.F.A. § 1(a), supra note 202, quoted supra text accompanying note
291.
298. U.C.F.A. § 2(b), supra note 202.
299. At the end of its discussion of the seat belt defense, the Kentucky
Supreme Court states:
[A] proper instruction will not specifically refer to a seat belt defense
but will state the general duty to exercise ordinary care for one's own
safety, leaving it to the jury to decide from the evidence whether the
failure to utilize an available seat belt was a breach of that duty in the
circumstances of this case, and, if so, whether such breach was a sub-
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violates a basic principle of the UCFA, that responsibility for
damages caused by both of the parties should be divided based
on their relative fault.
The version of the seat belt defense proposed in this Arti-
cle is based on the same principle of comparative fault as the
UCFA. Jurisdictions that have adopted the UCFA, either by
legislative or judicial action, thus should adopt the seat belt de-
fense proposed in this Article.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt the seat belt defense. Plaintiffs should
bear a portion of the loss caused by their unreasonable failure
to wear a seat belt. Courts should apply the seat belt defense in
cases in which, at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was
protected by an air bag. Seat belts provide substantial added
protection, and the finder-of-fact should determine whether a
reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would wear a
seat belt. Courts should interpret mandatory seat belt use stat-
utes, where possible, to support the adoption of the seat belt de-
fense. Mandatory use statutes evidence a recognition by the
legislature of the unreasonableness of the failure to wear a seat
belt.
Under the seat belt defense, plaintiffs should recover all
damages that they would have suffered if they had worn seat
belts, and courts should divide responsibility for exacerbation
damages based on the relative fault of the parties. Such a seat
belt defense is consistent with the underlying comparative fault
principle of modern tort law that loss should be borne by those
who created it, based on their relative fault.
stantial factor contributing to cause or enhance the claimant's
injuries.
729 S.W.2d at 181. Presumably, the court would instruct the jury, based on the
portion of the court's opinion discussed at supra text accompanying note 296,
that it should mitigate the plaintiff's recovery "to the extent the patient's in-
jury was aggravated or increased by his own negligence." 729 S.W.2d at 178. If
the jury is not given such an instruction, then it would be free to apply any
seat belt defense it desired, as discussed supra text accompanying notes 189-
269.
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